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Abstract 
 
A rich mixture of government incentives and fees to encourage the collection of used products and the 
subsequent remanufacturing has been increasingly utilized both domestically and internationally. In 
this paper, toward a fuller understanding of such government participation in closed-loop supply 
chains (CLSC’s), we construct and analyze a series of game-theoretic CLSC models with 
remanufacturing. Specifically, we investigate a basic decentralized CLSC model, two government 
participation models of linear incentives and fees as well as of central coordination via alternative 
financial instruments, and a revenue-sharing contract model without the government participation. 
We also analyze the impact of competition among manufacturers in our results. A key differentiating 
feature in our government participation models is the incorporation of the revenue neutrality 
requirement from a government’s perspective whose financial sources for such incentives must 
eventually reconcile with the financial sinks for such fees. By comparing and contrasting the 
equilibrium solutions and the economic consequences of these models, managerial insights and 
economic implications relevant to academics and practitioners including decision and policy makers 
are obtained. For example, we show how the government participation can induce an entry or prevent 
an exit of a CLSC when one or more members are unprofitable. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Objectives and Overview 
This research is motivated by the concurrent practices and plans of a heterogeneous and sometimes 
seemingly unrelated mixture of incentives and fees that are theoretically difficult to collectively 
analyze, compare, and produce policy and decision implications and guidelines for. They are often 
practically difficult to implement due to the complexity and ambiguity of the legislations as well. This 
research provides guidelines to those involved in the process of designing and analyzing the 
environmental laws and regulations. 
To our best knowledge, however, there have been few papers that address the implications 
from a government’s perspective whose financial sources for such incentives must eventually 
reconcile with the financial sinks for such fees. Under these circumstances, as a first step toward a 
fuller understanding of such government participation, in this paper, we construct four CLSC models 
with remanfuacturing, and utilize these models to obtain insights and implications including policy 
and decision guidelines. The specific research objectives are: 
(1) To analyze the impact of governmental participation via incentives and fees in the economic 
efficiency of a closed-loop supply chain. 
(2) To investigate alternative mechanism that can improve the economic efficiency of a closed-loop 
supply chain. 
(3) To analyze the impact of competition among manufacturers in the efficiency of a closed-loop 
supply chain with governmental participation. 
The outlines and the background information of each model derived in this paper are as follows: 
First, we construct a basic decentralized CLSC model without government participation 
consisting of a manufacturer who manufactures as well as remanufactures her product of a single 
kind, customers who directly purchase from the manufacturer, and a collector who collects the used 
products from customers and sells them back to the manufacturer. In the basic model as well as all the 
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other subsequent models, we assume that the manufacturer sells directly to the customers. For 
example, Chiang et al. (2003) report that 42% of top suppliers like IBM, Estee Lauder, and Nike have 
begun to sell directly to customers over the Internet. Furthermore, companies such as Dell, Sony, and 
HP have long been offering their products directly to their customers via the Internet.  
Also, we assume that the manufacturer has sufficient channel power over the collector to act 
as a Stackelberg leader (hence, the collector is the follower; see e.g., Savaskan et al. 2004). This is a 
reasonable assumption as major manufacturers who also remanufactures such as Kodak, BMW, IBM, 
DEC, and Xerox (Atasu et al. 2008b) do seem to have more than sufficient channel power relative to 
collectors of their products. In addition, in this paper, by remanufacturing we mean restoring used 
products to their original performance standards based on Section 3102-e(1)(b)(5) of the Public 
Authorities Law in the state of New York (New York State Department of Taxation and Finance 
1999b).  The scope in this paper is restricted to the products described in this law, such as: facsimile 
machines, photocopiers, printers, duplication equipment, magnetic ink cartridges, toner cartridges, 
inkjet cartridges and printer cartridges. 
 Following the formulation of the basic model, our analyses of the basic model include the 
economic efficiency and the collection rate at the equilibrium, which also serve as the benchmark 
reference points later. By economic efficiency, we mean the total surplus or the sum of all profits of 
the manufacturer, collector, and customers (i.e., consumer surplus), and it is often referred to as the 
social welfare from a social planner or a government perspective. Also, we note that the collection 
rate is an important environmental measure because some critical legislations such as the Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive contains the minimum target that must be met 
(Atasu et al. 2009) even though there certainly are other environmental measures. 
Based on the basic model, we next propose two new models of the government participation 
with the revenue neutrality requirement. By revenue neutrality, we mean that all the incentives must 
be financed by all the fees without any external financial source or sink (i.e., all the fees and 
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incentives are endogenously raised and spent, and the net gain to the government is zero). This 
revenue neutrality requirement allows us to concentrate on the economic efficiency of the incentives 
and fees without the distraction of financial sources to fund the incentives or financial sinks to apply 
the fees that are external to the CLSC models (Mrozek 2000).  
In the first extension, we simultaneously consider a remanufacturing incentive for the 
manufacturer and a collecting incentive for the collector as well as a manufacturing fee for the 
manufacturer and a consumption fee for the customers where all incentives and fees are linear in 
product quantity. We note that the linear incentives and fees are easy to understand and implement, 
and have been widely used in the literature (e.g. Baker 1992). Also they are of importance on their 
own right and as a first order approximation - especially in the absence of more sophisticated previous 
studies in the context of this paper. In this way, fairly large classes of linear incentives and fees are 
incorporated within a single framework and we are able to concurrently address a wide variety of 
scenarios, which may first appear different and separate, and provide a unified analysis on the 
equilibrium solutions and the economic efficiencies. We also note that, a priori, the improvement of 
the economic efficiency may be unclear due to the revenue neutrality requirement. For this extended 
model, through the analysis of various bounds, we demonstrate that the economic efficiency does 
improve – if the government sets the incentives and fees at the optimal levels. Otherwise, the 
economic efficiency may deteriorate relative to the decentralized model.  
In the second extension, we assume that there exists a social planner (see e.g., Carraro and 
Topa 1995) who centrally coordinates the forward and the reverse flows of products so as to 
maximize the total surplus. This leads to the upper bound of the total surplus that is theoretically 
achievable. We then show how the government can achieve this theoretically maximal total surplus 
via alternative financial instruments under the revenue neutrality requirement. 
With these government participation models, we proceed to the basic model cases where one 
or more of the CLSC members are unprofitable. In the context of recycling, there have been 
4 
 
numerous documents indicating that government incentives should be utilized when the recycling 
efforts are not profitable (Evans 1994). On the other hand, in the context of remanufacturing, there 
seem to be few quantitative papers addressing either the cases of unprofitable CLSC’s or the 
government participation in such cases. As the same logic of unprofitability and incentives is easily 
extendable to the case of remanufacturing, under the extended and centrally coordinated model 
framework, we will show how the government participation may induce an entry of a new CLSC or 
prevent an exit of an existing CLSC. We will also provide concrete guidelines for the government 
efforts regarding these aspects.  
In this paper, in addition, we examine how the manufacturer and the collector can coordinate 
themselves without the government by constructing a revenue-sharing contract model (see e.g., 
Cachon and Lariviere 2005). In this model, the sum of the CLSC member profits is maximized, but 
not the total surplus. Next, we proceed to compare and contrast all the models studied in this paper 
focusing on the economic efficiencies as well as the collection rate. Finally, we show how the 
economic distribution issues may be addressed in order to implement the proposed CLSC models of 
the linear incentives and fees, central coordination, and revenue-sharing contract as some initial 
allocation may not be agreeable to one or more members of the CLSC’s. We then extend our analysis 
to the case where two manufacturers act as the leaders in a Stackelberg-Cournot game. 
1.2 Environmental Laws 
In recent years, the usage of government incentives and fees to facilitate the collection of used 
products and the subsequent remanufacturing has significantly increased at all of local, state, national, 
as well as international levels. At the same time, the types of incentives and fees vary greatly from a 
community to a community. For example, in New York, remanufacturers receive tax credits that are 
commensurate with the number of employees and/or the durability of capital investment (New York 
State Department of Taxation and Finance 1999a). Also, in 2008, a federal bill was introduced to 
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allow a credit against income tax for remanufacturing or recycling equipment. It, however, is unclear 
if the federal definition of the remanufacturing or recycling is consistent with those of states (H.R. 
5659-Government Relations: The Remanufacturing Institute, 2009). Furthermore, in the context of 
recycling, in California, customers pay an advance recovery fee for numerous video display devices 
(Electronic Waste Recycling Act California 2003) while collectors are reimbursed for the costs of 
collection per pound (Council of State Governments 2009). In addition, in Minnesota, certain 
electronics manufacturers pay a fee that is commensurate with their sales quantities. Table 1 shows 
some of the states that currently have an environmental legislation as well as their characteristics. 
Table 1. Comparison of environmental legislation in US. 
State Incentive Fee Product 
California A key element of the act that 
affects e-waste collectors and 
recyclers is the availability of 
recovery and recycling payments 
to approved participants for 
certain collection and recycling 
activities 
ARF (Advance Recycling Fee) 
charged to customers at point of 
sale. 
The fee depends on the size of the 
device: 
• between 4 and 15 inches $8; 
• between 15 and 35 inches $16;  
• 35 inches and larger $25 
Cathode ray tube, 
televisions and 
computer monitors; 
LCD desktop 
monitors, laptop 
computers with LCD 
displays; LCD 
televisions;  
plasma televisions; 
portable DVD  
Connecticut The state will use the fees to 
administer a recycling program.  
Manufacturers must register with 
the state Department of 
Environmental Protection and pay 
an annual fee. 
Desktop or personal 
computers, computer 
monitors, portable 
computers, televisions. 
Illinois All registration fees are deposited 
in  the Electronics 
Recycling Fund 
Manufacturers must register with 
the state and pay an annual fee of 
$5,000.  
Computer, computer 
monitor, television, 
printer.  
Maryland Fees are deposited in a fund to 
make grants to counties and 
municipalities to implement local 
collection plans. 
The manufacturer 
registration fee is$10,000 for the 
initial registration 
Computer or video 
display devices with a 
screen greater than 
four inches. 
Minnesota As an incentive to increase 
collection. Recyclers, collectors, 
and manufacturers can multiply 
the actual weight collected by 1.5. 
 
Manufacturer pays a registration 
fee for year one.  
• $1,250 for companies 
manufacturing fewer than 100 
units per year for sale  
•$5000 for manufacturers 
producing more than 100 units 
per year  
 Regulated video 
display devices 
(VDDs):televisions, 
laptop computers and 
computer monitors 
with displays larger 
than nine inches, 
measured diagonally.  
New Jersey The department shall make 
payments to the county or 
municipality,based upon the costs 
incurred municipality  
 IT companies will include 
payments with their annual fees, 
calculated as weight times 50 
cents per pound of product sold. 
Desktop or personal 
computer, computer 
monitor, television 
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Considering these examples, it is highly desirable to understand what the managerial insights 
and economic implications of the government participation through incentives and fees may be on 
closed-loop supply chains (CLSC’s).  
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that, in the context of CLSC’s, formulates the 
government participation models subject to the revenue neutrality requirement via active and creative 
pricing of incentives and fees, and analyzes the economic efficiencies and collection rates relative to 
benchmark models without the government. From a broader perspective, this paper contributes to a 
fuller understanding of the impact of the government incentives and fees in the context of CLSC’s 
that are nowadays ubiquitous across the U.S. and certain international regions such as the European 
Union. That is, this paper strongly argues that the government incentives and fees do have major 
ramifications on CLSC’s in terms of economic efficiency and collection rate. Accordingly, various 
guidelines with respect to economic parameters are provided for the decision and policy makers to 
determine deliberate and purposeful choices on the kinds of financial instruments and the levels of 
incentives and fees to each member of CLSC’s.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide a brief review of the 
relevant literature. Next, in Chapter 3, we elaborate on the major assumptions, and present the basic 
decentralized CLSC model with one manufacturer and one collector. We then extend the basic model 
by incorporating the government participation subject to the revenue neutrality requirement via the 
linear incentives and fees. Additionally we construct a centrally coordinated model, and show how the 
theoretically maximal economic efficiency can be achieved via the alternative financial instruments. 
We also examine the cases where one or more members of the CLSC are unprofitable, and the 
government participation and its policy and decision implications on the entry and exit of CLSC’s. 
Finally, we present the revenue-sharing contract model without the government as well as the 
economic comparisons, and address the distributive issues of all the models. In Chapter 4, we derive 
the basic model that presents competition among manufacturers. We extend the basic model by 
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incorporating the governmental participation via incentives and fees. We show how the optimal levels 
of the incentives and fees can be determined under the requirement of revenue neutrality when the 
firms have symmetric costs and they sell a homogeneous product. We derive a centrally coordinated 
model and present the theoretical upper bound of the total surplus. We generate a mechanism that 
achieves the upper bound for the case of homogeneous products and symmetric costs and then present 
an approximation for the case of heterogeneous products. In Chapter 5, we discuss the implications of 
our findings for some current policies in Mexico. Finally, in Chapter 6, we make concluding remarks 
and comment on future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
In this section, we briefly review the most pertinent publications to this paper in the existing 
literature. The study of CLSC’s is a relatively new field of research, and there exist numerous 
challenging managerial problems (Atasu et al. 2008a, Guide and Van Wassenhove 2006). Within this 
study of CLSC’s, a game-theoretic framework has been widely utilized so as to gain insights about 
the decisions of CLSC members and their economic consequences (see e.g., Webster and Mitra 
2007). Moreover, within the game-theoretic framework for collection and remanufacturing, Savaskan 
et al. (2004) examine various collection strategies with respect to channel structures under a 
Stackelberg game for a manufacturer/remanufacturer, a retailer, customers, and a collector. In 
contrast, in this paper, the channel structure is simpler and fixed, but the increasingly ubiquitous 
governmental participation via incentives and fees is investigated for economic and environmental 
consequences. In both cases, we note that the fundamental driver of remanufacturing is the cost 
savings for the maximization of profits, and not a requirement by the government or corporate wishes 
for better image.  
In the context of closed-loop supply chains with competition, Savaskan and Wassenhove 
(2006) described a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer that sells his product to two 
competing  retailers. The objective was to analyze the reverse channel that would improve the 
collection rate and total profit. In contrast, in this paper, we examine the competition among 
manufacturers while they sell directly to the customer. Ferguson and Toktay (2006) analyze the 
competition that the original manufacturer faces from the remanufacturer. In this paper the game is 
played in a two-stage period, where the new product is introduced in the first period and the 
remanufactured product enters the market in the second period. In this paper we analyze competition 
among manufacturers which are also remanufacturers, so the competition appears at the initial stage 
of the game. Choi (1991) analyzed a channel structure with two competing manufacturers and one 
intermediary (a common retailer) that sells both manufacturers' products. This paper studied different 
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noncooperative games of different power structures between the two manufacturers and the retailer, 
i.e., two Stackelberg and one Nash games. This is the approach in this paper. 
In the area of governmental participation as a social planner, the use of taxes and subsidies as a 
tool to improve social welfare has been widely studied (Galiana et al. 2003). Carraro and Topa (1995) 
analyze the impact of environmental regulation in the form of taxation on the innovation activity of 
firms. In that paper, the regulation problem is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the 
government sets its policy instruments. In the second stage, the firms decide whether and when to 
innovate. The regulator’s objective function is the sum of the consumer surplus and industry profits, 
which is the total surplus.  
The governmental participation through a scheme of incentives and fees that aims to align 
different objectives is similar to the principal’s problem in the economic theory of agency (Ross 
1973).  As in Mirrlees (1976), the members in our CLSC models have different objectives, and 
behave in accordance with their own interest. Hence, we can view that the government in our models 
will need an incentive contract in the form of incentives and fees so as to maximize the total surplus, 
which is the principal’s objective. 
Once the government participates through incentives and fees, for cash flow issues in practice 
and for completeness issues in theory, it is highly desirable to address how these incentives are 
financed or the collected fees get utilized eventually. For this, Mrozek (2000) argues that 
deposit/refund systems must be implemented in a way that the revenue is neutral. That is, the amount 
of incentives disbursed is equal to the amount of fees collected within a closed system without a 
source or a sink for cash flow that is external to the model under consideration.  
In this paper, as in Carraro and Topa (1995), the economic efficiency is measured in total 
surplus while, as in Mrozek (2000), the revenue neutrality is exploited in several applicable sections. 
In the area of environmental regulations on supply chains, Webster and Mitra (2007) examine 
the impact of take-back laws when a manufacturer and a remanufacturer compete. In their study, two 
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possible implementations of a take-back law are analyzed based on the degree of control that the 
manufacturer has on returns sold to the remanufacturer. Also, in Mitra and Webster (2008), the 
impact of governmental subsidies for remanufacturing is examined and a mechanism to distribute 
subsidies to benefit both manufacturer and remanufacturer is presented. Furthermore, Hammond and 
Beullens (2007) investigate a CLSC network with governmental participation through the Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) directive. This investigation shows how the 
manufacturer’s and consumer’s behavior under different schemes of environmental regulations can be 
quantitatively modeled and analyzed. Also, Atasu et al. (2009) examine a series of efficient take-back 
legislation models with subsidies. 
We note that these papers explicitly or implicitly assume that the government financial 
instruments are exogenous factors or external to their models subject to no limitation (i.e., no upper 
bound or budget). In addition, the need of government participation to create a viable environmental 
supply chain has been well described in the literature. For example, Evans (1994) analyzes the impact 
of the Resource Recovery Act that encourages private recycling operators to undertake operations that 
were first unprofitable. In this paper, in the context of CLSC’s, we formalize various conditions under 
which the government can influence the entry and exit of CLSC’s, clarifying the relevance of the 
government participation. 
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3. Closed-loop Supply Chain with One Manufacturer 
3.1 Description of the Supply Chain and Assumptions 
In this section, we formulate and analyze a basic closed loop supply chain consisting of a 
manufacturer who manufactures as well as remanufactures her product of a single kind, customers 
who directly purchase from the manufacturer and a collector who collects the used products from 
customers and sells them back to the manufacturer. We incorporate the participation of a collector 
since a third party collector can be more technically advanced in collection and recovery of returned 
products (see Hamza et al. 2007). We assume that there are no governmental incentives or fees. 
Figure 1 depicts the configuration of the basic model. 
 
Figure 1. Basic Model 
We denote the manufacturer’s per unit selling price as w. Given w, we assume that the manufacturer 
faces a demand of D(w) = δ – βw where δ > 0 is the maximal demand of the product and β > 0 
denotes the decrease in demand for a unit increase in price w. We note that the linear demand 
functions have been widely utilized in economic models (Dobbs 1991, Gutiérrez-Alcaraz and Sheblé 
2005). In order for the manufacturer to manufacture and remanufacture she incurs in a fixed cost of 
Mk . 
We also assume that, after consuming the products, the customers are willing to return them 
to the collector and that the collector incurs a cost e per unit collected representing his level of 
 
Forward product flow
Manufacturer Customers
Collector
Reverse product flow
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collection efforts. e specifically represents the expenses per unit collected of additional collection 
bins, business hours, advertising, promotions and campaigns, etc. The collector then sells the 
collected used products to the manufacturer at a buyback price of d per unit. The relation between d 
and e is given by e = d - λ where λ represents the per unit profit margin for the collector.  
We assume that the used product collection rate from the customers is commensurate with the 
level of collection efforts represented by e. φ(e) denotes the collection rate, and we assume that 
φ(e)=ke where e є [0,1/k] and k > 0. We note that the linear collection rate functions are of 
importance in and of themselves as well as a first order approximation of more sophisticated 
functions (Qiaolun et al. 2008). The collector incurs in a fixed cost of Ck to implement the system for 
collecting the products. In our models the per unit collection cost is represented by e (collection 
efforts). The total cost of collection to the collector can be expressed as ( )* *w ke eδ β−  . Atasu et 
al. (2009) presents, in one section, a per unit cost times demand which is increasing quadratically in 
collection rate. This is consistent with our case since we can rewrite the total cost of collection as 
( )
2( )e
w
k
ϕ
δ β−  . Our total collection cost structure is different from Savaskan et al. (2004)  in the 
sense that we only have a variable cost of collection, while they presented a variable cost and an 
investment cost. However, as in our case, we can see that the total collection cost is increasing 
quadratically in collection rate.  
Finally, we denote the manufacturing cost per product as while the remanufacturing cost 
per product as . We assume that remanufacture cost  is less than the manufacturing cost by an 
amount of ∆. As in Savaskan et al. (2004) the remanufacture savings are the main driver for the 
reverser flow.  In what follows, we elaborate on the five key assumptions that are applicable 
throughout this paper. 
mc
r
c
r
c cm
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ASSUMPTION 1: The planning horizon is a static single period. The selling price w, the buyback price 
d, and the profit margin λ are decided in a static single period. By this simplifying assumption, we 
imply a steady-state type model (as in Guide et al. 2003, Savaskan et al. 2004). In this way, we can 
concentrate on the aspect of the governmental incentives and fees without being distracted by 
dynamic ramifications that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
ASSUMPTION 2: The customers make no distinction between the newly manufactured and the 
remanufactured products. The validity of this assumption depends on the nature of the product, but 
there are examples for which the new and remanufactured versions are perceived as having no 
difference. e.g., a single-use camera or a copy machine (Hammond and Beullens 2007).  
ASSUMPTION 3: We assume that the parameters of the model are such that the optimal quantity 
demanded is positive and the optimal collection rate φ(e) satisfies 0 < φ(e) < 1. We make this 
assumption to focus on much more relevant and interesting cases of feasible interior solutions without 
being distracted by technical and perhaps pathological boundary solutions. 
ASSUMPTION 4: All products collected are sold back to the manufacturer and remanufactured. We 
note that this assumption is often found in the literature for simplification (Savaskan and Van 
Wassenhove 2006). It can be relaxed by considering a parametric level of fractions. On the other 
hand, such a relaxation does not seem to yield much additional insights or implications in our models. 
ASSUMPTION 5: While optimizing their objective functions, all supply chain members have access to 
the same information without uncertainty. This assumption allows us to bypass confounding factors 
such as inefficiencies related to asymmetry of information and risks due to uncertainties (Nagarajan 
and Bassok 2005, He et al. 2006), which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
Throughout this paper we will assume that both the collector and the manufacturer will operate as 
long as their profit level is nonnegative. In this section we assume that the manufacturer and collector 
have nonnegative profit level. 
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3.2 Basic Model 
We now proceed to formulate the basic model and derive the equilibrium solution as follows. The 
profit maximization problem for the collector (the follower) given w and d by the manufacturer (the 
leader) is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )CB CMax w d e w e e kλ δ β ϕ δ β ϕΠ = − − − −                                       (1) 
In (1), the profit is expressed as the difference between the revenue from selling the collected 
products to the manufacturer and the variable cost of collecting the used products and the fixed cost 
for the operation of the system. With the linear collection rate, we simplify (1)  to 
( ) ( )CB CMax w e kλ δ β λϕΠ = − − . Because the objective function is strictly concave in λ (see 
Appendix A), the collector’s first order condition characterizes the unique best response, 
2B
d
λ =  
The manufacturer’s problem, on the other hand, is to maximize her profit over w and d. That is, 
( ) ( )( )
,
( )Mw d B m MMax w w c d e kδ β ϕΠ = − − + ∆ − −                                 (2) 
where the first part of the right hand side represents the quantity demanded,  the second part of the 
right hand side represents the profit per unit and the third part shows the fixed costs to operate the 
production system. 
Substituting the collector’s best response function ( )B dλ  into (2), the manufacturer’s profit 
maximization problem is given by 
( )
,
1 ( )
2
M
w d B m MMax w w c kd d kδ β
 Π = − − + ∆ − − 
 
                                (3) 
It can be verified (see Appendix A) that the unique optimal equilibrium solution is:  
( ) 2* *8
,
16 2
m
B B
c k
w d
δ β β
β
+ − ∆ ∆
= =  
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 Given the manufacturer’s solution, the collector’s equilibrium solution is *
4B
λ
∆
= . Hence, the 
level of collection efforts is *
4B
e
∆
=  and the corresponding collection rate is given by *Bϕ  4
k ∆ =  
 
. 
In addition, the profits for the collector and the manufacturer at the equilibrium are given by 
( )( )* 2 28
256
mC
B C
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = −  and 
( )( )* 28
256
mM
B M
c k
k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
Π = − . 
As for the customers, we measure their “profits” from their business transactions with the consumer 
surplus (CS). CS can be defined as the triangular area under the linear demand curve and above the 
rectangle representing the total purchase cost to the customers. Hence, 
                                                                      (4) 
At the equilibrium, it can be verified that 
( )( )22
*
8
512
m
B
c k
CS
δ β β
β
− + ∆
= . 
As mentioned earlier, the economic efficiency will be measured by the total surplus (TS), which is the 
sum of the profits of the collector and manufacturer as well as the consumer surplus. Hence, 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )22 2 2 2
*
8 8 8
256 256 512
m m m
B C M
k c k c k c k
TS k k
δ β β δ β β δ β β
β β
∆ − + ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆
= − + − +       (5) 
We simplify (5) to express the equilibrium total surplus as 
( )( ) ( )( )2 2
*
24 5 8
512
m m
B C M
c k c k
TS k k
δ β β δ β β
β
− + ∆ − + ∆
= − −                           (6) 
In the basic model, there exist some straightforward and managerial insights. For example, we 
observe that as ∆  increases, *Bw  decreases while 
*
Bd  increases. That is, the manufacturer will pass 
along some of the manufacturing cost savings from the increase in ∆  to the customers in the form of 
a lowered *Bw . She will also increase the buyback price so as to encourage the collector to provide 
( ) ( )
2
1
2 2
w
C S w w
δ βδ
δ β
β β
− 
= − − = 
 
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more used products to her. From the collector’s perspective, the profit margin and the level of the 
collection efforts both increase as ∆  increases, which is intuitive. It is also interesting to observe that 
the social welfare related measures such as the profits and the surpluses all increase with respect to ∆  
which implies the substantial importance of the remanufacturing cost saving on the social welfare. 
In this section, we have derived the equilibrium solution as well as economic efficiency and 
collection rate of the basic model without governmental participation. This model can be considerer 
as conventional model since it does not include any external mechanisms (see Cachon and Lariviere 
2005). 
In what follows, we will contrast and compare these results with the ones obtained with 
various governmental linear incentives and fees. 
3.3 Extended Model with Governmental Incentives and Fees  
In this section, we extend the basic model by simultaneously incorporating a remanufacturing 
incentive for the manufacturer and a collecting incentive for the collector as well as a manufacturing 
fee for the manufacturer and a consumption fee for the customers. In this way, we can concurrently 
address a wide variety of scenarios and provide a unified analysis on the equilibrium solutions and the 
economic efficiency and collection rate. For example, in California, customers pay an advance 
recovery fee for numerous video display devices (Electronic Waste Recycling Act California 2003). 
Also, in Minnesota, certain electronics manufacturers pay a fee that is commensurate with their sales 
quantities (Council of State Governments 2009). In addition, in California (Council of State 
Governments 2009), collectors are reimbursed for the costs of collection per pound. Furthermore, in 
New York, remanufacturers receive tax credits that are commensurate with the number of employees 
and/or the durability of capital investment (New York State Department of Taxation and Finance 
1999a). Also, on March 31, 2008, U.S. Rep. Phil English (R-Pa.). introduced H.R. 5659, a bill 
designed to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow a credit against income tax for 
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recycling or remanufacturing equipment. H.R. 5659 will establish a tax credit equal to 20 percent of 
the amount of a taxpayer’s expenditures on certain equipment purchases (Government Relations: The 
remanufacturing institute, 2009) 
Also, a key reason that we consider a multiple number of incentives or fees simultaneously is 
to investigate the impact of the relative weights for the incentives or fees. e.g., does a remanufacturing 
incentive contribute to a higher level of economic efficiency than a collecting incentive? In addition, a 
key reason that we consider both incentives and fees simultaneously is to lay the groundwork on the 
financial source to fund the incentives and the financial sink for the usage of the fees that will be 
examined in later sections. Figure 2 depicts the participation of the government through the incentives 
and fees in the free market model. 
 
Figure 2. Extended Model with Governmental Incentives and Fees (E) 
In this extended model, we incorporate fairly large classes of linear incentives and fees within 
a single framework. Linear incentives and fees have been widely used in the literature (e.g. Baker 
1992, Fershtman and Judd 1987). Also they are of importance on their own right and as a first order 
Manufacturer Customers
Collector
Government
Governmental incentives/fees
Forward product flow
γ(1-y)
αx
α(1-x)
γy
Reverse product flow
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approximation - especially in the absence of more sophisticated previous studies as in the case of this 
paper. We now elaborate on the linear incentives and fees as follows.  
Let us first begin with the incentives. We assume that the government provides an incentive 
total of α  dollars per unit collected or remanufactured ($/unit). That is, the government provides xα  
to the collector per unit collected where x  represents the fraction of α that goes to the collector per 
unit collected while (1 )x−  represents the fraction of α that goes to the manufacturer per unit 
remanufactured. In this paper,  represents the overall incentive per unit collected or 
remanufactured, and will be modeled as a passive parameter in this section and an active decision 
variable in the next section. On the other hand, , , will be utilized as a what-if type 
parameter that will generalize numerous particular policies.  
Let us now proceed to the fees. We assume that the government receives a fee total of  dollars per 
unit assembled or purchased ($/unit). That is, the government receives  from the 
manufacturer per unit assembled where  represents the fraction of  that is charged to the 
manufacturer while the government receives  from the customers per unit purchased where  
represents the fraction of  that is charged to the customers. As in the case of , in this paper,  
represents the overall fee per unit assembled or purchased, and will be modeled as a passive 
parameter in this section and an active decision variable in the next section. On the other hand, , 
, will be utilized as a what-if type parameter that will generalize numerous particular 
policies.  
With the introduction of these incentives and fees, the basic model from the previous section is 
extended as follows. The collector’s profit expression is given by 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )CE CMax w d x e w e e kλ δ β γ α ϕ δ β γ ϕΠ = − + + − − + −                            (7) 
α
x
 
x ∈[0,1]
γ
 
γ (1− y)
 
(1− y) γ
 
γ y
 
y
γ α γ
y
[0,1]y∈
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In (7),  represents the adjusted demand function given  (see e.g., Binger and 
Hoffman 1998) as the demand is now  while  
represents the collection amount given . At the same time, represents the revenue per 
unit collected given . Hence, for the collector, the first and second terms represent the revenue 
and the cost, respectively. 
As , we simplify (7) to ( ) ( ) ( )CE CMax w x e kλ δ β λ α ϕΠ = − + − , which will be 
maximized by the collector over . Since this objective function is strictly concave in λ, from the 
first order condition, the best unique response is given by 
2E
d xα
λ
−
= .   
On the other hand, the manufacturer’s profit maximizing problem can be formulated as 
( )( ) ( )( )
,
(1 ) (1 ) ( )Mw d E m MMax w y w c y d x e kδ β γ γ α ϕΠ = − + − − − + ∆ − + − −            (8) 
Given Eλ , it can be verified (see Appendix A) that the unique optimal equilibrium solution is:  
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )2* *8 1 2 1 2
,
16 2
m
E E
c y k x
w d
δ β γ β α α
β
+ + − − + ∆ ∆ + −
= =  Also, for the collector, the 
corresponding equilibrium solution is: 
( )* 1 4
4E
xα
λ
∆+ −
=  . 
Given these expressions for the decision variables at the equilibrium, we proceed to obtain 
relevant managerial insights of the pricing, and to compare and contrast with the expressions derived 
in the basic model. We first analyze from the collector’s perspective the impact of the government’s 
participation through the incentives and fees. Specifically, we focus on the collector’s profit margin 
relative to that (
 
λB
* =
∆
4
) in the basic model. 
If x > 1/4, then the collector’s profit margin is decreased at the equilibrium due to the incentive 
of 
 
αx . This implies that, when the incentive for collection is sufficiently large relative to the 
( )w yδ β γ− +
 
γ y
( ) ( )( ),D w y w yγ δ β γ= − + ( )( ) ( )w y eδ β γ ϕ− +
 
γ y
 
(d +αx)
 
αx
 
e = d − λ
λ
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incentive for remanufacturing, the collector finds it more beneficial to reduce the profit margin. An 
intuitive reasoning is as follows: by reducing the profit margin, the collector produces an effect to 
increase the collection effort level and the collection rate, which will benefit from the governmental 
incentive. At the same time, the manufacturer produces an effect to decrease the buyback price, which 
will lead to the lower selling price and higher quantity demanded from the customers. This will, in 
turn, lead to the higher quantity collected, which once again will benefit the collector from the 
governmental incentive. 
If x < 1/4, then the collector’s profit margin is increased at the equilibrium due to the incentive 
of 
 
αx . This implies that, when the incentive for collection is sufficiently small relative to the 
incentive for remanufacturing, the collector finds it more beneficial to increase the profit margin. 
Managerial insights for this case can be obtained as in the previous case in a similar way. 
If x = 1/4, then the collector’s profit margin remains the same. This is an important threshold 
value for regulatory policies given the definitions of our α, γ, x, and y as any change of the fraction at 
this point will change the direction of the collector’s pricing strategy. In turn, this change of the 
direction will alter the manufacturer’s pricing strategy differently. 
Let us now proceed to analyze from the manufacturer’s perspective the impact of the 
government’s participation through the incentives and fees. Specifically, we focus on the 
manufacturer’s buyback price and selling price relative to those ( *
2B
d ∆= , 
( ) 2* 8
16
m
B
c k
w
δ β β
β
+ − ∆
= ) in the basic model. 
For *Ed , if x <1/2, then the manufacturer’s buyback price is increased at the equilibrium due to 
the incentive of 
 
α (1− x) . This implies that, when the incentive for remanufacturing is sufficiently 
large relative to the incentive for collecting, the manufacturer finds it more beneficial to increase the 
buyback price. An intuitive reasoning is as follows: by increasing the buyback price, the manufacturer 
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produces an effect to induce the collector to increase the collection rate. The increased collection rate 
will lead to the increased quantity to be remanufactured, which will benefit from the governmental 
incentive. 
If x > 1/2, the manufacturer’s buyback price is decreased at the equilibrium due to the incentive 
of 
 
α (1− x) . This implies that, when the incentive for remanufacturing is sufficiently small relative to 
the incentive for collection, the manufacturer finds it more beneficial to decrease the purchase price 
for the used product from the collector. Managerial insights for this case can be obtained as in the 
previous case in a similar way. 
If x = 1/2, the manufacturer’s buyback price remains the same. This is also an important 
threshold value for regulatory policies given the definitions of our α, γ, x, and y as any change of the 
fraction at this point will change the direction of the manufacturer’s buyback pricing strategy. In turn, 
this change of the direction will alter the collector’s pricing strategy differently. 
For *Ew , if y < 1/2 (i.e., 
 
1− 2 y  > 0), then the manufacturer’s selling price contains a 
component that contributes to a higher level of the selling price due to the manufacturing fee of 
 
γ (1− y) . This implies that, when the fee for manufacturing is sufficiently large relative to the fee for 
consumption, there exists an inducement for passing the increased cost of manufacturing to the 
customers. This pressure to raise the selling price is counter-balanced by another component in the 
selling price that contributes to a lower level of the selling price due to the incentive total of α  
dollars per unit collected or remanufactured. This incentive, as addressed in the cases of *Eλ  and 
*
Ed , 
implies a reduction in the cost of manufacturing, and there exists a counter-inducement for passing 
the cost savings of manufacturing to the customers in the form of a reduced selling price. Hence, the 
exact direction and magnitude comparisons between *Ew  vs. 
 
wB
*
 will depend on a particular set of the 
remaining parameter values. 
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If  y > 1/2 (i.e., 
 
1− 2 y  < 0), then the manufacturer’s selling price contains a component that 
contributes to a lower level of the selling price due to the manufacturing fee of 
 
γ (1− y) . This 
implies that, when the fee for manufacturing is sufficiently small relative to the fee for consumption, 
there actually exists an inducement for the manufacturer to lower the selling price so as to alleviate 
the magnitude of reduction in the customers demand due to the relatively significant consumption fee 
that the customers now pay. At the same time, there exists another component in the selling price that 
contributes to a lower level of the selling price due to the incentive total of α  dollars per unit 
collected or remanufactured. Hence, in this case, the selling price will decrease regardless of any 
particular set of the remaining parameter values. 
If y = 1/2, then the manufacturer’s selling price contains no component that contributes to a 
change of the selling price due to the manufacturing fee of 
 
γ (1− y) . On the other hand, there still 
exists the incentive of α , which implies that the selling price will decrease. 
Let us next examine the impact of the governmental incentives and fees on the environmental 
efficiency represented by the collection rate. From our definition of the collection rate, at the 
equilibrium, we have ( ) ( )
4E E E
e k d k αϕ λ ∆ + = − =  
 
 Compared to the basic model’s *Bϕ  
4
k ∆ =  
 
, for α > 0,  the collection rate is strictly higher in the extended model. 
Finally, let us examine the impact of the governmental incentives and fees on the economic 
efficiency represented by the levels of the profits, consumer surplus, and total surplus. Such values 
and the corresponding decision variables are summarized in Table 2 as follows. 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 2. Extended Model with Governmental Incentives and Fees 
 
Objective Function Value Decision Variable(s) 
Co
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o
r 
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o
fit
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 8
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E C
k c k
k
α δ β γ β α+ ∆ − + + + ∆
Π = −  
( )1 4
4E
xα
λ
∆ + −
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M
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u
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o
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( )( ) ( )( )228
256
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E M
c k
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δ β γ β α
β
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Π = −  
( )1 2
2E
x
d
α∆ + −
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( )( )( ) ( )28 1 2
16
m
E
c y k
w
δ β γ β α
β
+ + − − + ∆
=
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n
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m
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rp
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( )( ) ( )( )228
512
m
E
c k
CS
δ β γ β α
β
− + + + ∆
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s ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 224 5 8
512
           
m m
E
C M
c k c k
TS
k k
δ β γ β α δ β γ β α
β
− + + + ∆ − + + + ∆
=
− −
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So far, we have modeled fairly large classes of incentives and fees within a single framework. 
In what follows, we further examine some special cases by fixing the values of the policy parameters 
x and y. In this way, some of the current practices may be better emulated as they are often simpler 
than the extended model with the four financial instruments in a single setting. Furthermore, in the 
next section, we revisit the extended model with the aforementioned revenue neutrality requirement, 
and derive conclusive results with respect to the economic efficiency of the linear incentives and fees 
described. 
3.3.1 Special Cases of Extended Model 
In this subsection, we will examine three special cases of the extended model. Namely, the cases of 
the manufacturing-fee collecting-incentive (MFCI), consuming-fee collecting-incentive (CFCI), and 
consuming-fee  remanufacturing-incentive  (CFRI).  These  represent the  extreme cases  of   (x = 1,  
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y = 0),  (x = 1, y = 1), and (x = 0, y = 1), respectively. Figure 3 depicts the configurations of these 
three cases. 
 
Figure 3. Special Cases of Extended Model 
 The derivation of the equilibrium solutions are straightforward, and the results are 
summarized in the following table. 
Table 3. Special Cases Equilibrium Solutions of Extended Model 
Variable MFCI CFCI CFRI 
λ  3
4
α∆ −
 
3
4
α∆ −
 
4
α + ∆
 
d 
2
α∆−
 
2
α∆ −
 2
α∆+
 
w ( )( ) ( )28
16
mc kδ β γ β α
β
+ + − +∆
 
( )( ) ( )28
16
mc kδ β γ β α
β
+ − − +∆
 
( )( ) ( )28
16
mc kδ β γ β α
β
+ − − +∆
 
 
 We note that, relative to the case of CFRI (the collector receives no incentive), the buyback 
price d and the profit margin λ  will decrease in the cases of MFCI and CFCI. The reason is that, with 
the governmental incentive, the collector does not need to achieve as high profit margin as in CFRI 
and the manufacturer does not need to pay as high buyback price as in CFRI. Likewise, relative to the 
case of MFCI (the manufacturer pays the fee), the selling price w will decrease in the cases of CFCI 
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and CFRI. The reason is that, the manufacturer does not need to charge as much as in MFCI where 
the cost increase due to the fee gets passed along to the customers in the form of an increased selling 
price. 
3.3.2 Revenue Neutrality Constraint 
We now assume the revenue neutrality. That is, all the incentives provided within the model 
are financed through all the fees received within the same model without any external financial source 
or sink. In the context of the extended model, the revenue neutrality is given by  
(9) 
where the left hand side of (9) represents the total amount of the fees and the right hand side of (9) 
represents the total amount of the incentives. The equation (9) is simplified to become: 
                                                                                                                     (10) 
We have the corresponding values for the objective functions and decision variables as in Table 4  
Table 4. Extended Model Results with Revenue Neutrality 
 Objective Function Value Decision Variable(s) 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1w y y w y y w y xk d w y x k dδ β γ γ δ β γ γ δ β γ α λ δ β γ α λ− + + − + − = − + − + − + − −
( )k dγ α λ= −
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By examining the objective function values and the corresponding decision variables, we observe the 
followings: 
a. The equilibrium decision variable values critically depend on the policy parameters x and y. That is, 
the government can profoundly influence the business strategies of the manufacturer and the collector 
by simply adjusting a parameter value or two. For example, if x is sufficiently high, *Eλ  may result in 
a negative number (which can be considered a loss-leader type pricing strategy; see e.g., Lal and 
Matutes 1994, Chevalier et al. 2003). 
b. The equilibrium values of the objective functions and the collection rate do not depend on the 
policy parameters x and y. This implies that, if the governmental focus is on the economic efficiency 
and collection rate, the question of what fraction of the incentives are allocated to the remanufacturer 
vs. the collector or what fraction of the fees are levied on the manufacturer or the customers may be 
irrelevant. 
c. The level of the collection rate increases with the incentives. Hence, this collection rate is higher in 
the extended model than in the basic model. 
Substituting (10) into Table 3, we can obtain the equilibrium solutions as functions of α  only 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Special Cases Equilibrium Solutions of Extended Model with Revenue Neutrality 
Variable MFCI CFCI CFRI 
λ  3
4
α∆ −
 
3
4
α∆ −
 
4
α + ∆
 
d 
2
α∆−
 
2
α∆ −
 2
α∆+
 
w ( ) ( )2 28
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β
+ + −∆
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β
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m
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β
+ − +∆ +∆
 
 
Without the revenue neutrality, for example, the difference in selling prices (MFCI – CFCI) is a 
function of γ  only and independent of α . On the other hand, with the revenue neutrality, any 
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increase in α  will lead to the increase in the difference. The reason is that any increase in incentive 
α
 must be financed by a proportional increase in γ . In the next section, we will expand on this 
observation, by modeling and analyzing an optimization version of the extended model with respect 
to α  and γ   subject to the revenue neutrality requirement. 
3.3.3 Optimal Incentive and Fee for the Extended Model 
In the previous section, the incentive and fee, α and γ, are treated as passive parameters. In this 
section, we treat the incentive and fee as active decision variables for the government to maximize the 
total surplus. A similar role for the government can be observed in the literature (Mrozek 2000, 
Calcott and Walls 2005, Becker and Schechter 1996). 
Therefore, the optimization problem now becomes
,
M C
E E E EMax TS CSα γ = +Π +Π  with the 
equilibrium expressions for w, d, and λ appropriately substituted into the relevant profit and consumer 
surplus expressions. Also, we impose the aforementioned neutrality of revenue in this section. 
Let us now examine this extended model. The government’s optimization problem is: 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )24 5 8
512
m m
E C M
c k c k
Max TS k kα
δ β β α α δ β β α α
β
− − − ∆ +∆ − − −∆ +∆
= − −        (11) 
The first order necessary condition leads to a unique optimal α* as shown in Appendix B. Even 
though α* can be easily programmed for computing, it is quite unwieldy for analytic uses. Hence, for 
analysis, we rely on indirect bounds of α*. Specifically, we show in Appendix B that 0 < α* <
 
∆
2
. 
This implies that 0 < γ* < 
 
3∆2k
16
 while * 3( ) ( )
4 8E
k kϕ∆ ∆< < . This in turn implies that the optimal 
collection rate is strictly greater than that in the basic model *( ( ))
4B
kϕ ∆= . As for the economic 
efficiency measured in total surplus, *ETS  = ( )*ETS α  > 
*
BTS  as shown in Appendix C. 
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The increase in the total surplus relative to the basic model is generated by the subsidy of 
collection rate and the fact that the fees that are charged as just a fraction of the incentive given (i.e.  
( )eγ αϕ= ) 
Therefore, in so far as the collection rate as well as the economic efficiency measured by the 
total surplus level, the governmental participation through the incentive and fee is well justified 
relative to the free market model without the governmental participation. 
For the extended model and the basic model, the profits and consumer surplus are compared 
as follows: 
* * * *
,
C C M M
E B E BΠ > Π Π < Π , and 
* *
E BCS CS<  (see Appendix D). This means that the 
manufacturer and the customers are better off without the governmental participation. However, the 
collector increases his profit with the optimal levels of the incentive and fee. 
With the levels of profits and surpluses, it is relatively easy to induce the manufacturer and 
the customers to voluntarily switch from the free market configuration of the basic model to the 
optimal governmental participation of the extended model. To do so, from the increase in the 
collector’s profit, a lump sum incentive will be provided to the manufacturer so that she is no worse 
off. At the same time, a lump sum incentive to the customers will be provided from the same source 
(for example, at the end of the year) assuming that such an incentive is not significant enough to alter 
the customers purchase quantities (see Pratt et al. 2004, Atkinson et al. 1999). 
To illustrate the key features of our models so far, we now present a numerical example. 
For this example, the hypothetical values of the parameters are as follows: δ = 1,000, 
m
c = $5/unit,  
= $4/unit, β = 20, and k = 0.45. Also, we will assume that the fractions x = 0.5 and y = 0.5 and 
0C Mk k= = . With these parameter values, we can plot the behavior of ETS  as a function of α as in 
Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. ETS  vs. α 
We note that with the optimal value of α, the total surplus will increase. On the other hand, with 
any other choice of α value, it is actually possible that the total surplus will decrease with the 
governmental participation. 
Furthermore, Table 6 summarizes the resulting equilibrium values for the variables and the 
economic and environmental consequences relative to the basic model. 
Table 6. Results for Basic and Extended Models 
Model λ d w α γ CΠ  MΠ  CS TS ( )eϕ  
Basic 1 2 27.05 NA NA 206.55 10534.05 5267.03 16007.63 0.45 
Extended  0.51 2 27.17 1.96 1.31 455.98 10435.4 5217.69 16109.1 0.67 
 
Relative to the basic model, since x > 1/4, the collector decreases his profit margin and still 
increases his profit due to the sufficient amount of the incentive he receives. For the manufacturer, 
since x=1/2, there is no impact of the incentive α on her buyback price, d. However, α induces an 
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increase in the selling price, which contributes to the decline of the profit level. For the customers, the 
overall effect of the incentives and fees is a decrease in their consumer surplus. We also note that the 
governmental participation in this example increases the total surplus as well as the collection rate.  
3.4 Centrally Coordinated Model  
In the previous section, we examined how the government maximizes the total surplus over 
the linear incentives and fees under the neutrality of revenue. In this section, we revisit the problem 
from a social planner’s perspective. Specifically, we assume that there exists a social planner who 
centrally coordinates the forward and the reverse flows of products so as to maximize the total 
surplus. This leads to the upper bound of the total surplus that is theoretically achievable denoted by
*
CCTS . We then provide an allocation mechanism that achieves this theoretical bound via pricing, and 
present a distribution mechanism that will make each party better off than in the basic model without 
governmental participation (Campbell 2006).  
From the social planner’s perspective, the profits of the collector and the manufacturer as well 
as the consumer surplus are given by ( )( ) ( ) Cw d e e kδ β ϕ− − − , 
( ) ( ) ( )( )m Mw w c d e kδ β ϕ− − + ∆ − − , and 
( )2
2
wδ β
β
−
, respectively. 
Hence, the total surplus under the central coordination is: 
    ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
2CC m C M
w
TS w d e e w w c d e k k
δ β
δ β ϕ δ β ϕ
β
−
= − − + − − + ∆ − + − −    (12) 
and (12) can be simplified to 
          ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
2CC m C M
w w
TS c w w e e k k
δ β δ β
δ β δ β ϕ
β
− +
= − − + − ∆ − + − −                 (13) 
We note that, with the social planner as the sole decision maker, the selling price w and the cost of 
collection efforts e are the only relevant variables in his maximization of CCTS . It can be verified (see 
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Appendix E) that the unique optimal solution is: 
2
* 4
4
m
CC
c k
w
− ∆
=  and 
 
eCC
* =
∆
2
. For further analysis, 
we assume that 24 0mc k− ∆ > . For example, mc  is sufficiently high. The corresponding optimal 
total surplus is given by 
( )( )22
*
4
32
m
CC C M
c k
TS k k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
= − −                             (14) 
while the corresponding optimal collection rate is given by *
2CC
kϕ ∆=  
Given (14), we have the following proposition (see Appendix C for the proof). 
Proposition 1. For the models described in this paper, the relationship among the levels of the total 
surpluses is given by * * *CC E BTS TS TS> >  . The collection rate is related as 
* * *
CC E Bϕ ϕ ϕ> > .  
3.5 Alternative Financial Instruments 
From Proposition 1, we see that the centrally coordinated model provides a higher level of economic 
efficiency and collection rate. However, the question arises as to how an allocation mechanism can be 
designed via pricing to achieve *CCTS  and 
*
CCϕ  as any direct attempt by the social planner to enforce 
the optimal selling price on the manufacturer and the optimal level of collection efforts on the 
collector is unrealistic.  
To answer this question, let us examine this issue mathematically. First, we note that a degree 
of operational flexibility represented by three control variables is necessary to satisfy the following 
three requirements: the cost of collection efforts must be equal to *CCe , the selling price must be equal 
to *CCw , and the revenue neutrality must be met. The details are elaborated in the next subsection.  
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3.5.1 Allocation Mechanism 
Let us first introduce the following financial instruments ofα , ε, and η . Incentive α  is as defined in 
the previous two sections. That is, x of α  is given to the collector per unit collected while 
 
(1− x) of 
α
 is given to the manufacturer per unit remanufactured. Fee ε is charged to the manufacturer per unit 
revenue (i.e., per dollar) for selling the product to the customers. Similar approaches have been used 
to analyze the behavior of the supply chain under incentives and fees (Kouvelis and Rosenblatt 2002). 
Finally, we utilize η  as an incentive (i.e., η  is negative) or as a fee (i.e., η  is positive) provided or 
charged to the manufacturer per unit sold. It can be shown that the conditions under which η  can be 
an incentive or fee are determined by the parameters ,k ∆ , and cm . 
Proposition 2. Theoretical total surplus 
( )( )22
*
4
32
m
CC C M
c k
TS k k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
= − −  can be achieved 
with ,AM AMα η and AMε defined as follows: ,AMα = ∆  
( ) ( )
( )
2 4 2
2
3 5 4
4
m m m
AM
m
k c k c c
c k
δ β β δ β
η
δ β β
∆ − + ∆ − −
=
− + ∆
 and ( )
( ) 2
4
2
4
m
AM
m
c
c k
δ β
ε
δ β β
−
= −
− + ∆
. 
It can be shown (see Appendix E) that the scheme defined in Proposition 2 achieves *CCTS .Table 7 
summarizes the levels of profits as well as the corresponding decision variables for the allocation 
mechanism described above. 
Table 7. Profits and Decision Variables for the Allocation Mechanism 
 Objective Function Value Decision Variable(s) 
Collector’s 
profit 
( )( )2 2* 4
16
mC
AM C
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = −  
( )* 2
2A M
x
λ
∆ − ∆
=  
Manufacturer’s 
profit 
 ( )* 21 44AM mw c k= −∆   
*
A Md x= ∆ − ∆  
( )( )2 2* 4
16
mM
AM M
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = − −
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The corresponding consumer and total surpluses are given by 
( )( )22
*
4
32
m
AM
c k
CS
δ β β
β
− + ∆
= and 
( )( )22
*
4
32
m
AM C M
c k
TS k k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
= − − , respectively.  
So far we have presented the scheme of incentives and fees that will achieve the maximal total 
surplus. For implementation purposes, however, the resolution of some distributive issues is 
necessary. For example, as the initially allocated profit of the manufacturer is negative, she has no 
incentive to operate without a lump sum payment from the collector and/or the customers, which may 
be relatively hard to implement (see Section 3.9 for details). 
3.6 Entry and Exit Implications of Governmental Participation 
In this section, we examine the implications of the governmental incentives and fees on the 
entry and exit aspects of the CLSC and its members. In the context of recycling, there have been 
numerous documents indicating that governmental incentives should be utilized when the recycling 
efforts are not profitable. On the other hand, in the context of remanufacturing, there seem to be few 
quantitative papers addressing either the cases of unprofitable CLSC’s or the governmental 
participation in such cases. 
As the same logic of unprofitability and incentives is easily extendable to the case of 
remanufacturing, under the extended and centrally coordinated model framework, we will show how 
the governmental participation may induce an entry of a new CLSC or prevent an exit of an existing 
CLSC. We will also provide concrete guidelines for the government efforts regarding these aspects.  
Specifically, in this section, we will mathematically characterize the conditions under which 
one or more members of the CLSC in the basic model are unprofitable. Then we will derive the extent 
to which such a CLSC can be viable in the long run (i.e., when it is currently viable only in the short 
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run as they are not covering the fixed cost) or the extent to which the governmental participation 
induces a viable CLSC to materialize (as its members currently do not see themselves viable).  
We now proceed to examine the three possible cases for the basic model of (A) only the 
manufacturer is unprofitable, (B) only the collector is unprofitable, and (C) both manufacturer and 
collector are unprofitable. In the first three subsections, under the framework of the extended model, 
we will sequentially examine the cases of (A), (B), and (C). In the fourth subsection, under the 
framework of the centrally coordinated model, we will re-examine the cases of (A), (B), and (C). 
3.6.1 The Case of the Unprofitable Manufacturer only 
As in case (A), if the manufacturer of the basic model is unprofitable, then the manufacturer would 
not be able to operate. This implies that the CLSC is not economically viable, and the corresponding 
total surplus is zero (TS = 0). Meanwhile from Section 3.3.3, we have 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* * * *
*
24 5 8
512
m m
E C M
c k c k
TS k k
δ β β α α δ β β α α
β
− − − ∆ +∆ − − −∆ +∆
= − −   
Hence, if the CLSC in the extended model is economically viable, then the difference in the total 
surplus levels is given by 
 
∆TS = TSE
*
. Then, the mathematical conditions corresponding to the case 
(A) when the governmental participation will enable the manufacturer to make nonnegative profit will 
be: 
a. 
( )( )* 228
0
256
mM
B M
c k
k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
Π = − <  b.
( )( )* 2 28
0
256
mC
B C
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = − ≥  
c.
*
* 0ME BTS +Π ≥  
Conditions a and b imply that, under the basic model, the profits from the manufacturer and the 
collector are negative and nonnegative, respectively. Condition c implies that the difference, TS∆  , is 
sufficiently large to afford a lump sum subsidy to the manufacturer so that her resulting overall profit 
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is nonnegative.
 
At the same time, if Condition c is not met, then under the extended model, TS∆ is 
too small to induce the manufacturer to operate in the CLSC. In what follows, let us derive the 
specific conditions, in terms of the fixed costs of the manufacturer and the collector, under which the 
government is able to induce an entry of a new CLSC or prevent an exit of an existing CLSC. 
First, we note that 
 
α *  in the extended model does not have a closed-form solution, and the
 
corresponding *ETS  is difficult to manipulate. Hence, we will utilize a lower bound 2E
TS α ∆ = 
 
 
where *
2E E
TS TS α ∆ > = 
 
 and 
( ) ( )2 227 324 8
4 4
2 512
m m
E C M
c k c k
TS k k
δ β β δ β β
α
β
  − + ∆ − + ∆  ∆    = = − − 
 
. 
Also, for notational simplicity, we utilize the notations,
 
A = δ − βc
m
and 
 
B = βk∆2 . 
 Now, conditions a and b result in 
( )28
256M
A B
k
β
+
>
 and ( )
2 8
256C
k A B
k
∆ +
≤ , respectively. 
Condition c on the other hand results in 
( )2
27 324 8 84 4
1024 512 2
C
M
A B A B A B kk
β β
  + +   +  ≤ + −  
Utilizing the upper bound of Ck  in condition b, a sufficient condition for the upper bound of Mk  can 
be obtained as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
2 2 22 2 2
27 324 8 8 84 4
1024 512 512
m m
m m
M
c k c k c k k c k
k
δ β β δ β β δ β β δ β β
β β
  
  
  
− + ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆ ∆ − + ∆
≤ + −
 
2 25120 1408 81
16384
A AB B
β
=
+ +
 
The corresponding ranges of 
 
kC  and 
 
kM (i.e., the differences between the upper and lower bounds of 
Ck  and Mk ) are given by 
( )2 8
256
k A B∆ +
 and 
2 21024 384 17
16384
A AB B
β
+ +
, respectively.  
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From our analysis of the bounds, we observe that
 
1. Given that 
( )2 8
256C
k A B
k
∆ +
≤
 and ( )
2 2 28 5120 1408 81
256 16384M
A B A AB Bk
β β
<
+ + +
≤ , the 
government will be able to induce an entry of a new CLSC or prevent an exit of an existing CLSC by 
implementing the linear incentives and fees of the extended model without external financial source 
or sink. 
2. As the remanufacturing cost saving ∆  or the collection effectiveness coefficient k  increases, the 
range of Ck  ( Mk  based on the sufficient condition) also increases. That is, the applicability of the 
governmental participation with respect to the collector’s fixed cost Ck
 
(the manufacturer’s fixed cost
 
Mk based on the sufficient condition) for inducing entries and preventing exits increases with ∆  and 
k . Conversely, as ∆  or k  decreases, the justification for the governmental participation with 
respect to the collector’s fixed cost Ck
 
will be less persuasive. 
3. As the remanufacturing cost saving ∆  or the collection effectiveness coefficient k  increases, the 
range based on the exact value of *ETS  and Ck  for the upper bound of Mk  will also increase when the 
measurement intervals are sufficiently large in ∆  or k  (showing a monotonic increase in ∆  or k  is 
technically difficult). 
From these observations, if the government wishes to induce an entry of a new CLSC or 
prevent an exit of an existing CLSC by implementing the linear incentives and fees of the extended 
model when only the manufacturer is not profitable, the accurate estimation of ∆  and k will be 
highly critical. In the case of larger∆  and/or k , the governmental participation may be worthwhile 
with wider areas of applicability with respect to Ck  and Mk . In the case of smaller∆  and/or k , on 
the other hand, the governmental participation may not be enough to induce an entry or prevent an 
exit, making such governmental efforts ineffective. 
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3.6.2 The Case of the Unprofitable Collector only 
As in case (B), if the collector of the basic model is unprofitable, then the collector would not be able 
to operate and the reverse flow of products will be inexistent. This implies that the forward channel is 
the only channel that is economically viable. The manufacturer’s objective function in the forward 
supply chain is stated in (15) 
( )( )MF m Mw w c kδ βΠ = − − −                                                      (15) 
In expression (15) the first term represents the demand and the second term represents the profit of 
selling only new products, since remanufacture is not allowed. It can be shown (see Appendix F) that 
the unique optimal solution for (15) is *
2
m
F
c
w
δ β
β
+
= This optimal solution results in 
( )2*
4
mM
F M
c
k
δ β
β
−
Π = − , ( )
2
*
8
m
F
c
CS
δ β
β
−
= and 
( )2* 3
8
m
F M
c
TS k
δ β
β
−
= −  
In this case, if the CLSC in the extended model is economically viable, the increase in the total 
surplus is given by * *E FTS TS TS∆ = − . Then, the mathematical conditions corresponding to the case 
(B) when the governmental participation will enable the collector to make nonnegative profit will be: 
a.
( )( )* 228
0
256
mM
B M
c k
k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
Π = − ≥  b.
( )( )* 2 28
0
256
mC
B C
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = − <  
c. 
*
* *C
E B FTS TS+Π ≥  
Conditions a and b imply that, under the basic model, the profits from the manufacturer and the 
collector are nonnegative and negative, respectively. Condition c implies that the difference TS∆ is 
sufficiently large to afford a lump sum subsidy to the collector so that his resulting profit will be 
nonnegative. If condition c is not met, then TS∆ is too small to induce the collector to operate in the 
CLSC. Following the approach described in subsection 3.6.1, we now derive the specific conditions, 
in terms of the fixed costs of the manufacturer and the collector, under which the government is able 
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to induce the creation of the reverse flow or prevent the disappearance of it. We will utilize again the 
lower bound 
2E
TS α ∆ = 
 
. For notational simplicity we utilize  
m
A cδ β= −  and   2B kβ= ∆                            
Conditions a and b result in ( )
2 8
256C
k A B
k
∆ +
>   and ( )
28
256M
A Bk
β
+
≤ . Condition c results in   
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2
22 2
27 324 8 8 34 4
1024 512 16
m m
m m
C
c k c k k c k c
k
δ β β δ β β δ β β δ β
β β
  − + ∆ − + ∆   ∆ − + ∆ −  ≤ + −  
2 21920 1452048
16384
AB BA
β
+ +
=  
From the previous analysis we can conclude that: 
1. Given that ( )
28
256M
A B
k
β
+
≤ and ( )
2 22 1920 1458 2048
256 16384C
AB Bk
k A B A
β
+ +
<
∆ +
≤ the government 
will be able to induce an entry of the reverse flow of products through the implementation of the 
linear incentives and fees described before. 
2. We notice that the observation from case (A) is also true in case (B) so the applicability of the 
governmental participation increases with ∆ and k . 
3. The applicability of the governmental participation does not depend on the actual fixed cost for the 
manufacturer. This implies that the government needs to focus only on the collector in order to see if 
he can afford a lump sum subsidy to the collector to make him operate in the CLSC. 
3.6.3 The Case of the Unprofitable Collector and Unprofitable Manufacturer 
In case (C) as in previous case (A) if the manufacturer of the basic model is unprofitable, then the 
manufacturer would not be able to operate and the CLSC would not be economically viable. This 
implies that the total surplus is zero. As in case (A) we have that *ETS TS∆ = . Then, the mathematical 
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conditions when the governmental participation will enable the manufacturer and the collector to 
make nonnegative profit will be: 
a.
( )( )* 228
0
256
mM
B M
c k
k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
Π = − <
 
b. ( )( )*
2 28
0
256
mC
B C
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = − <  
c. 
* *
* 0C ME B BTS +Π +Π ≥  
Conditions a and b imply that, under the basic model, the profits from the manufacturer and the 
collector have negative profits. Condition c implies that the difference TS∆  is sufficiently large to 
afford a lump sum subsidy to the manufacturer and the collector so that their resulting overall profit is 
nonnegative. We now derive the specific conditions, in terms of the fixed costs of the manufacturer 
and the collector, under which the government is able to induce an entry of a CLSC. 
Conditions a and b result in ( )
2 8
256C
k A B
k
∆ +
>    and ( )
28
256M
A Bk
β
+
>  , respectively. With the lower 
bound 
2E
TS α ∆ = 
 
we can rewrite condition c as
2 25120 2176 177
16384MC
A AB Bk k
β
+ +
+ ≤
 
We notice that condition c is stated as the sum of the fixed cost of the supply chain, rather that of the 
individual costs. The corresponding range for MCk k+ is given by 
2 21024 640 49
16384
A AB B
β
+ +
  
From our analysis of the bounds, we observe that: 
1. The government can induce the creation of a CLSC when 
2 25120 2176 177
16384MC
A AB Bk k
β
+ +
+ ≤  
2. As the remanufacturing cost saving ∆ or the collection effectiveness coefficient k increases the 
range of the sum of the fixed costs increases. This means that the applicability of the governmental 
participation with respect to the collector’s fixed cost and the manufacturer’s fixed cost for inducing 
entries and preventing exits increases. When both manufacture and collector are unprofitable the 
government should considerer both fixed costs to analyze the convenience of his participation. 
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3.6.4 Impact of Centrally Coordinated Model on Unprofitability 
We will now show how the governmental participation through the use of the alternative 
financial instruments described in section 3.5 can induce the entry or prevent the exit of a CLSC. In 
this subsection follow the same approach as in previous subsection to derive the extent to which such 
a CLSC can be viable in the long run.  
From section 3.5 we have that the government, through the alternative financial instruments 
can now achieve 
( )( )22* 4
32
m
C MCC
c k
TS k k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
= − −  Following the same analysis that we 
present in subsections 3.6.1, 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 we show the results for case (A) only the manufacturer is 
unprofitable, (B) only the collector is unprofitable, and (C) both manufacturer and collector are 
unprofitable. Table 8 presents the mathematical conditions corresponding to the case (A) (B) and (C) 
when the governmental participation will enable the manufacturer to make nonnegative profit.  
Table 8. Unprofitability with *CCTS  
Case Conditions 
Only  the manufacturer is 
unprofitable ( )( )*
228
0
256
mM
B M
c k
k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
Π = − <
 
( )( )* 2 28 0
256
mC
B C
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = − >
 
*
* 0MCC BTS +Π ≥
 
Only the collector is 
unprofitable ( )( )*
228
0
256
mM
B M
c k
k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
Π = − >
 
( )( )* 2 28 0
256
mC
B C
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = − <
 
*
* *C
CC B FTS TS+Π ≥  
The manufacturer and the 
collector are unprofitable ( )( )*
228
0
256
mM
B M
c k
k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
Π = − <
 
( )( )* 2 28 0
256
mC
B C
k c k
k
δ β β∆ − + ∆
Π = − <
 
* *
* 0C MCC B BTS +Π +Π ≥  
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The analysis of condition c and the ranges for the fixed costs are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. Ranges for Fixed Costs under Alternative Financial Instruments where 
m
A cδ β= −
           
and 2B kβ= ∆ . 
Case Exact  conditions as a 
function of other fixed cost 
Exact  conditions Ranges 
A 
 
( )28
256M
A B
k
β
+
>
 
2 2192 80 9
512 2
C
M
kA AB Bk
β
+ +
≤ −
( )2 8
256C
k A B
k
∆ +
≤
 
( )28
256M
A B
k
β
+
>
 
2 224 9
64M
A AB Bk
β
+ +
≤
 
 
For Mk  
2 232 20 3
256
A AB B
β
+ +
 
B 
 
( )2 8
256C
k A B
k
∆ +
>
 
( )1408 113
16384C
B A B
k
β
+
≤
 
( )28
256M
A B
k
β
+
≤  
The same conditions as in 
previous column 
 
For Ck  
2 2864 1432 179
13824
A AB B
β
+ +
 
 
C ( )2 8
256C
k A B
k
∆ +
>
 
 
( )28
256M
A B
k
β
+
>  
2 296 44 5
256MC
A AB Bk k
β
+ +
+ ≤  
The same conditions as in 
previous column 
 
 
For   
C Mk k+
 
2 24640 1444 1355
6912
A AB B
β
+ +
 
 
From Table 8 and 9 we notice that observations 2 and 3 from subsection 3.6.1 also applies with the 
alternative financial instruments. Since this instruments achieve the maximum total surplus the 
governmental participation may be worthwhile with wider areas of applicability with respect to Ck
and Mk  . 
3.7 Revenue-Sharing Contract Model  
In the previous sections, we have formulated and analyzed the decentralized model, the 
governmental participation model with linear incentives and fees, and the centrally coordinated model 
with alternative financial instruments by the government. In this section, we first address the question 
of how the manufacturer and the collector can coordinate themselves without the government by 
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constructing a revenue-sharing contract model. We then examine the impact of such coordination on 
the economic efficiency and the collection rate.  
In the literature, in the absence of the government, there are a multiple number of 
coordination mechanisms that maximize the total profit of the members of a supply chain. A 
particular mechanism that has been extensively studied recently is a revenue-sharing contract model 
by Cachon and Lariviere’s (2005). In the context of our paper, the revenue-sharing contract is a 
coordination mechanism offered by the manufacturer to the collector. This contract modifies the 
collector’s profit function so as to align his own profit maximization to the total profit maximization 
of the CLSC. 
Before the collector decides the level of his collection efforts, e, the manufacturer and the 
collector agree to the following revenue-sharing contract that has two parameters. The first is d 
representing the buyback price per unit paid by the manufacturer to the collector and the second is χ
representing the fraction of the collector’s revenue that he keeps for himself while (1 )χ−  of his 
revenue is delivered to the manufacturer.  
The corresponding mathematical development is as follows: For the CLSC described in 
Figure 1, the total profit of the manufacturer and the collector, TP, is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )( )m C MTP w w c e e k kδ β ϕ= − − + ∆ − − −                                 (16) 
If the manufacturer and the collector behave as a single decision maker, TP can be maximized with 
respect to the decision variables w and e. Since TP is concave in w and e (see Appendix F), the 
optimal solution is 
( ) 2* 4
8
m
TP
c k
w
δ β β
β
+ − ∆
= and *
2TP
e
∆
= . The corresponding optimal total profit 
is given by 
( )( )22
*
4
64
m
C M
c k
TP k k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
= − − . 
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One way to induce the collector to set the level of his collection efforts to *TPe  is for the manufacturer 
and the collector to agree on a contract that results in the collector’s profit CΠ  being equal to TPχ . 
In order to produce such a contract, let us consider 
( ) (1 )( ) ( ) C Mm
RSC
k k
w c ke e e
wd
ke
χ χ
χ χ
δ β
− −
− + + ∆ − +
−
=  and ( ]0,1χ ∈ . 
From the basic model of Section 3.2, the collector’s profit function is given by 
( ) ( )CB Cw dke w eke kδ β δ βΠ = − − − − . Given the values of the parameters, RSCd  and χ , the 
collector’s profit function can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )( )CRSC C Mw w cm e ke k kχ δ β Π = − − + ∆ − − −                             (17) 
From this, we observe that the contract between the manufacturer and the collector transforms the 
collector’s profit function as a fraction of the total profit of the CLSC. It can be verified (see 
Appendix F) that the unique optimal solution for (17) is *
2RSC
e
∆
= . Meanwhile, the manufacturer’s 
profit function is given by  
( ) ( )( )MB m Mw w c d ke kδ βΠ = − − + ∆ − −                                     (18) 
Substituting RSCd and *RSCe  into (18) leads to  
( ) ( )
2
1
4
M
RSC m C M
k
w w c k kχ δ β
  ∆
Π = − − − + − −  
  
                           (19) 
It can also be verified (see Appendix F) that the unique optimal solution for (19) is 
( ) 2* 4
8
m
RSC
c k
w
δ β β
β
+ − ∆
= . With these results, it can be easily verified that the sum of the 
collector’s and manufacturer’s profits is 
( )( )22
*
4
64
m
C M
c k
TP k k
δ β β
β
− + ∆
= − −  . 
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 In this type of contracts, the actual value of χ depends on the firm’s relative bargaining power.  
3.8 Comparative Examinations 
In the following propositions we state relationship between the individual profits, consumer surplus 
and the total surplus presented throughout this paper. For proposition 3 and proposition 4 we take the 
approach of pursuing the goal of having the two partners gain one-half each of the total profit (see 
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo 2002). See Appendix C and D for proof of propositions 3 and 4 
respectively.  
Proposition 3. With 0.5χ = if 
a. 
2 216 24 7 640
64
C
M
A AB B kk β
β
− − +
< < then the collector’s profit is related as 
* * * *C C C C
B E AFI RSCΠ <Π <Π < Π .  
b. 
2 2 2 216 24 7 64 512 32 5 2048
64 2048
C C
M
A AB B k A AB B kkβ β
β β
− − + − + +
< < then the collector’s 
profit is related as 
* * * *C C C C
B E RSC AFIΠ <Π <Π < Π . 
c. 
( )22 2 8512 32 5 2048
2048 256
C
M
A BA AB B k kβ
β β
+− + +
< < then the collector’s profit is related as 
* * * *C C C C
B RSC E AFIΠ <Π <Π < Π . 
For the manufacturer’s perspective, with 0.5χ = if 
a. 
2 2512 64 23 20480
2048
C
M
A AB B kk β
β
− − +
< < then the relationship between her profit is  
* * * *M M M M
AFI RSC E BΠ < Π < Π <Π  
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b. 
2 2 2 2512 64 23 2048 32 128
2048 128
C C
M
A AB B k A B kkβ β
β β
− − + − +
< < then the relationship 
between her profit is  
* * * *M M M M
AFI E RSC BΠ < Π < Π <Π  
c. 
( )22 2 832 128
128 256
C
M
A BA B k kβ
β β
+− +
< < then the relationship between her profit is  
* * * *M M M M
AFI E B RSCΠ < Π < Π <Π  
Proposition 4. The relationship between consumer surplus is * * * *E B RSC AFICS CS CS CS< < < . The 
relationship between total surplus is * * * *B E RSC AFITS TS TS TS< < <  and for collection rate is 
* * * *
B E AFI RSCϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ< < =  
From proposition 3 we observe that the scheme preferred by the collector and the manufacturer 
depends on the actual value of the fixed costs. However, from the perspective of maximizing the total 
surplus, the alternative financial instruments are the scheme that the government should incorporate. 
From Proposition 4, we note that although the economic efficiency of the revenue-sharing contract is 
less than of the centrally coordinated model, the revenue-sharing contract achieves the maximum 
collection rate for the CLSC. 
3.9 Distributive Issues 
Let us address the economic distribution issues that may be necessary to implement the 
proposed CLSC models of the linear incentives and fees, central coordination, and revenue-sharing 
contract as follows: In Section 3.5, we have already noted that, under the alternative financial 
instruments, the manufacturer’s profit would be negative without any distributive action. Hence, let us 
first address the distribution issues of the negative profit among the various models. We note that, for 
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notational simplicity, throughout the rest of this section, we utilize the notations,
m
A cδ β= − and 
2B kβ= ∆ , and all variables and objective function values are at their optimal values without *. 
As the baseline, we will assume that the profits of the basic model are nonnegative. That is, 
( )8 0
256
C
B C
B A B
k
β
+
Π = − ≥  and 
( )28 0
256
M
B M
A B
k
β
+
Π = − ≥ . The initial allocation results are 
summarized in Table 10. We note that, and ( )
28
0
512B
A B
CS
β
+
= >  without further assumption. 
Table 10. Initial Allocation Results and the Distributive Actions 
Linear incentives and fees Alternative instruments Revenue-sharing contract 
( ) ( )( )2 2 2
0
8
256 C
C
E
k A k
k
α β α
Π = ≥
+∆ − −∆
−
( )( )
2
2 28
256
M
E M
A k
k
β α
β
Π = −
+ ∆ −
 
( )
2
2 2
0
8
512ECS
A kβ α
β
 
 
 = >
+ ∆ −
 
( )4 016
C
AFI C
B A B
k
β
+
Π = − ≥
( )4 0
16
M
AFI C
B A B
k
β
≤
+
Π = − −
( )24 0
32AFI
A B
CS
β
+
= >  
  
( )2
0
4
64
C
RSC MC
A B
k kχ
β
 
 Π = ≥
 
  
+
− −
( ) ( )
2
0
4
1 64
M
MRSC C
A B
k kχ
β
 
 Π = ≥
 
  
+
− − −
( )2
0
4
128RSCCS
A B
β
= >
+
 
 
The distributive actions that will be necessary to overcome the negative profits so that each member 
has a sufficient incentive to operate in the various models are as follows: 
1. For the case of linear incentives and fees, if MEΠ is negative, then the gain in the total surplus will 
be used to make it nonnegative. Specifically, a lump sum coming from the additional profit of the 
collector will be paid to the manufacturer so that her overall profit is now zero as only the collector 
gains additional profit relative to the basic model (i.e., C CB EΠ < Π  and B ECS CS> ). 
2. For the case of alternative financial instruments, as MAFIΠ  is negative, the gain in the total surplus 
will be used to make it nonnegative. Specifically, a lump sum will be paid to the manufacturer so that 
her overall profit is now zero. This payment will first come from the additional profit of the collector 
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(since C C
BAFI
Π > Π ). If the additional profit is not sufficient, then the balance of the payment will 
come from customers (since AFI BCS CS> ). We note that in this case, a tax such as a community-
based one that does not influence the customers’ purchase decision may be necessary (unless such a 
tax is negligible to the customers). 
3. For the case of revenue-sharing contracts, the nonnegative profits assumption in the basic model 
implies that the profits from this model are nonnegative as well. 
As all unprofitable cases are now addressed, let us proceed to examine what distributive 
actions are necessary for each party of the basic model to move to the other models without making 
anybody worse off. 
4. For the case of linear incentives and fees, a lump sum coming from the additional profit of the 
collector will be paid to the manufacturer so that her overall profit is now no less than that in the basic 
model. Also, a payment such as a year-end rebate that does not influence the customers’ purchase 
decision from the same source will be made to the customers so that the consumer surplus is now no 
less than that in the basic model (unless such a payment is negligible to the customers). 
5. For the case of alternative financial instruments, a lump sum will be paid to the manufacturer so 
that her overall profit is now no less than that in the basic model. This sum will come from the 
additional gains of the collector and customers (similar to Case 2). 
6. For the case of revenue-sharing contracts, with 0.5χ = , only when 
2 232 128
128
C
M
A B k
k
β
β
− +
> , a 
lump sum will be paid to the manufacturer so that her profit is no less than that in the basic model. 
This sum will come from the additional gains of the collector and customers (similar to Case 2). 
 We note that there are other distributive issues beyond what we have addressed. For example, 
the remaining gain in the total surplus after making nobody worse off can be distributed based on the 
bargaining power of each member of the CLSC. Likewise, the fraction χ  may be determined based 
 on the market power of the manufacturer vs. the collector. For both cases, further studies are highly 
desirable. 
The following numerical example shows the difference between the models presented in this 
paper with respect to the total surplus obtained as well as other parameters.
For this example, the hypothetical values of the parameters are as follows: 
= $4/unit, β = 20, k = 0.45, Ck =
shows the total surplus in the different models presented in this paper.
Figure 5. Total surplus for the Basic Model, Extended Model, Alternative Financial Instruments, 
We can see that relative to the basic model and the extended model, the revenue
increases the total surplus. However, there is
 
δ = 1,000, 
100,  1000Mk =  and 0.5x y= = and 0.5χ = The graph in figure 5
 
Revenue- Sharing contract 
-sharing contract 
 still a great range of improvement that can actually be 
48 
mc = $5/unit,  
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achieved with the alternative financial instruments. Table 11 shows the rest of the results for the 
example. 
Table 11.  Results for numerical example for Basic, Extended, AFI, Revenue-Sharing Contract. 
 Basic Model Extended Model Alternative Financial 
Instruments 
Revenue-sharing 
contract 
λ  1 0.51 0 11.9316 
d  2 2 2 13.9316 
w
 27.05 26.501 3.2 26.6 
α
 
NA 1.96 4 NA 
ε
 
NA NA 1.0385 NA 
η
 
NA NA 0.2769 NA 
CΠ  106.55 356.403 1584.8 4925.6 
MΠ  9534.05 9435.1 -2684.8 4925.6 
CS  5267.03 5217.55 21902.4 5475.6 
TS  14907.6 15009.1 20802.4 15326.8 
( )eϕ  0.45 0.6705 0.9 0.9 
 
3.10  Discussion of Results 
The results for this chapter show that relative to the basic model, the linear incentives and fees can 
improve the economic efficiency and collection rate if they are set at the optimal level. This result 
was derived with the constraint of revenue neutrality. It is important to notice that the analysis 
without the revenue neutrality will set α as high as possible and γ=0. The question now arises as to 
how the incentive is financed. A complete analysis should be done taking into account the source of 
this incentive, because it might imply a tax charged to other activities or products. 
It is also necessary to notice that the management of any program of incentives and fees will generate 
costs that are not taking into account in any of our models. Further research must be done to derive an 
approximation of the cost of management per product, since it is possible these costs are for a set of 
products.   
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4. Closed-loop Supply Chain with Multiple Manufacturers 
4.1 Description of the Supply Chain and Assumptions 
In this section, we formulate and analyze a basic closed loop supply chain consisting of two 
manufacturers who manufactures as well as remanufactures their products of a single kind, customers 
who directly purchase from the manufacturers and a collector who collects the used products from 
customers and sells them back to the manufacturers. We assume that the collector consolidates every 
product collected, classifies the product by brand and then returns the product to its original 
manufacturer. Figure 6 depicts the configuration of the basic model with competition. 
 
 
Figure 6. Basic Model with Competition 
The two manufacturers produce substitute products, with manufacturer 1 producing an amount 1q  
units and manufacturer 2 producing an amount of 2q . 
Following Singh and Vives (1984) the representative customer maximizes the consumer surplus that 
is expressed as ( )
2
1 2
1
, i i
i
U q q w q
=
−∑ where iq is the amount of good i and iw its price.  The utility 
function is defined as ( ) ( )2 21 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2, 2 / 2U q q q q q q q qδ δ β θ β= + − + + where iδ and iβ are 
Manufacturer1 Manufacturer2
Customers
Collector
Forward Product Flow
Reverse Product Flow
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positive, 21 2 0β β θ− > and 0i j jδ β δ θ− > for i j≠ . This utility function gives rise to a linear 
demand structure. The inverse demands are given by 1 1 1 1 2w q qδ β θ= − − and 2 2 2 2 1w q qδ β θ= − −  
We also assume that, after consuming the products, the customers are willing to return them to 
the collector and that the collector incurs a cost 1e and 2e  per unit collected of product 1 and product 
2 respectively. ie i=1,2 specifically represents the expenses per unit collected of additional collection 
bins, business hours, advertising, promotions and campaigns, etc. The collector then sells the 
collected used products to the manufacturer i at a buyback price of id  per unit. The relation between 
id  and ie  is given by i i ie d λ= − where iλ  represents the per unit profit margin for the collector.  
We assume that the used product collection rate for product i is commensurate with the level of 
collection efforts represented by ie . ( )i ieϕ  denotes the collection rate for product i, and we assume 
that ( )i i i ie k eϕ =  for i=1,2 where 
10,i
i
e
k
 
∈ 
 
 and ik > 0. Finally, we denote the manufacturing cost 
per manufacturer as 
mic the manufacturing cost for manufacturer i and ric  the remanufacturing cost 
per product. We assume that remanufacture cost 
ric  is less than the manufacturing cost mic by an 
amount of i∆ . In this chapter we do not include fixed costs since our intention is to gain insights 
about the impact of competition among manufacturers not to derive entry and exit implications that 
were analyzed before. 
ASSUMPTION 6: All products collected are sold back to their original manufacturer and 
remanufactured. We note that this assumption is often found in the literature for simplification 
(Savaskan and Van Wassenhove 2006). In our model the collector sorts the products and returns each 
product to its original manufacturer. This assumption is consistent with products as single-used 
camera’s supply chain, where all collected products are consolidated in a single facility and there they 
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are sorted and retuned to their original manufacturer (Kodak One-Time-Use Camera). The reason is 
that a manufacturer may not have the technology to remanufacture a product other than his 
(Goldstein, 1994) 
4.2 Basic Model 
We now proceed to formulate the basic model and derive the equilibrium solution as follows: each 
manufacturer chooses the quantity to sell and the buyback price using the response function of the 
collector, conditional on the observed quantity and buyback price of the competitor’s product. The 
collector determines the profit margin of each product so as to maximize total profit from both brands 
given the respective quantities and buyback prices. The manufacturers take the collector’s reaction 
function into consideration for their respective decisions.  
The profit maximization problem for the collector (the follower) given 1q , 2q  and 1d , 2d  by 
the manufacturers (the leaders) is: 
1 2, 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
( ) ( )CBMax q k d q k dλ λ λ λ λ λΠ = − + −  
Because the objective function is strictly concave in λi (see Appendix G), the collector’s first 
order condition characterizes the unique best response 11 2
d
λ = and 22 2
d
λ =  
The manufacturers’ problems, on the other hand, are to maximize their profit over 1 1,w d  and 
2 2,w d . That is, 
( ) ( )( )1
1 1, 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M
q d B mMax q q c d k d qδ β θ λΠ = − − − + ∆ − −  
( ) ( )( )2
2 2, 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
M
q d B mMax q q c d k d qδ β θ λΠ = − − − + ∆ − −                           (20) 
Substituting the collector’s best response function into (20), the manufacturer’s profit 
maximization problem is given by 
53 
 
( )1
1 1
1
, 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 12
M
q d B mMax q q c d k d qδ β θ
 ∆  Π = − − − + ∆ − −  
  
 
( )
2 2
2 2
, 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 22
M
q d B mMax q q c d k d qδ β θ
 ∆  Π = − − − + ∆ − −  
  
 
The simplest and the most widely used technique for demonstrating the existence of Nash equilibrium 
is through verifying concavity of the players’ payoffs, which implies continuous best response (or 
reaction) functions.  With this approach it can be verified (see Appendix G) that the unique 
optimal equilibrium solution is: 
2 2
* 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
16 16 2 8 8
,
8( 4 )
m m
B
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− − ∆ − + + ∆
=
− +
2 2
* 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
16 16 2 8 8
,
32 8
m m
B
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− + + ∆ + − − ∆
=
−
* 1
1 2B
d ∆= and * 22 2B
d ∆=  
 Given the manufacturers’ solution and the collector’s equilibrium solution the level of 
collection efforts is *1
1
4B
e
∆
= and * 2
2
4B
e
∆
= and the corresponding collection rate is given by *1Bϕ  
1
4
k ∆ =  
 
 and * 2Bϕ  
2
4
k ∆ =  
 
. The profits for the collector and the manufacturers at the equilibrium 
are given by 
*
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
2
1 2
( 8 8 ) ( 8 8 ) (4 ( ) (4 4 ) )
64(4 )
C m m m m
B
k c k k c k k c k c kβ δ β δ δ δ θ
β β θ
∆ − + + ∆ + ∆ − + + ∆ + ∆ − + − − ∆ ∆
Π =
−
and *1
2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 2
(16 2 (8 ) ( 8 8 ) )
,
64( 4 )
M m m
B
c k c kβ β β δ δ θ
β β θ
− + ∆ + − + + ∆
Π =
− +
*
2
2 2 2
2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
(16 2 (8 ) ( 8 8 ) )
64( 4 )
M m m
B
c k c kβ β β δ δ θ
β β θ
− + ∆ + − + + ∆
Π =
− +
 
As for the representative customer, we measure his “profits” from his business transactions 
with the consumer surplus (CS). CS can be defined as the difference between the utility and the total 
purchase cost to the customer. Hence, 
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( )1 2
1
, i i
i
CS U q q w q
=
= −∑  
At the equilibrium, it can be verified that  
* 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 22 2
1 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 2 3
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 (4 ( (8( ) ) (8( ) ) )
128( 4 )
3( (8( ) ) (8( ) ) )
2(8( ) )(8( ) ) )
B m m
m m
m m
CS c k c k
c k c k
c k c k
β β β δ β δ
β β θ
β δ β δ θ
δ δ θ
= − + ∆ + − + ∆
− +
− − + ∆ + − + ∆
+ − + ∆ − + ∆
 
The economic efficiency will be measured by the total surplus (TS), which is the sum of the profits of 
the collector and manufacturer as well as the consumer surplus. Hence, 
* 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 2
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 (4 ( (24( ) 5 )(8( ) )
128( 4 )
(24( ) 5 )(8( ) )) 8 (4(32( ) 5 )( )
(20( ) 3 ) ) ( (8( ) 3 )(8(
B m m
m m m m
m m m
TS c k c k
c k c k c k c
k c k c k c
β β β δ δ
β β θ
β δ δ β β δ δ
δ θ β δ δ
= − + ∆ − + ∆ +
− +
− + ∆ − + ∆ − − + ∆ − +
− + ∆ ∆ − − + ∆ − 2 21 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 3
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2
) ) (8( ) 3 )
(8( ) )) 4(2(16( ) 3 )( ) (6( ) ) ) )
m
m m m m
k c k
c k c k c k c k
β δ
δ θ δ δ δ θ
+ ∆ + − + ∆
− + ∆ + − + ∆ − + − + ∆ ∆
 
4.2.1 The Case of Homogeneous Products with Symmetric Cost 
To get some insights about the behavior of the supply chain under competition, we now assume that 
the products are perfect substitutes and that the firms have symmetric cots. This implies that the 
selling price is the same for the two manufacturers and they only compete on the quantity to sell. We 
also assume that the 1 2k k k= =  since the products are indistinguishable for the customer.  
We define now Q a bw= − as the total quantity demanded of both products (i.e. 1 2Q q q= + ). 
Solving for w gives ( 1 2)a Qw A BQ A B q q
b b
= − = − = − + . Finally, we have 1 2m m mc c c= = and 
1 2∆ = ∆ = ∆   
With this assumptions we the objective function for the collector expressed as  
55 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ) ( )CB H q k d q k dλ λ λ λ−Π = − + −  
From concavity of the objective function the unique best response (see Appendix G) for the collector 
is the set his margins to:  11 2B H
d
λ − =
2
2 2B H
d
λ − =  
As for the manufacturers their profits are expressed as 
1
1 2 1 1 1 1( ( ) ( ))MB H mA Bq Bq c d k d qλ−Π = − − − + ∆ − −  
2
2 1 2 2 2 2( ( ) ( ))MB H mA Bq Bq c d k d qλ−Π = − − − + ∆ − −  
As shown in Appendix G, the unique best response is: 
2
* *
1 2
8( ) ( )
24
m
B H B H
A c kq q
B
α
− −
− + + ∆
= =  
* *
1 2
1
2B H B H
d d− −= = ∆At equilibrium we have that 
( )( )* 2 28
192
mC
B H
k A c k
B−
∆ − + ∆
Π = and  
( )( )* *
1 2
228
576
mM M
B H B H
A c k
B− −
− + ∆
Π =Π =
 
The consumer surplus and the total surplus are expressed as ( )( )
22
*
8
288
m
B H
A c k
CS
B−
− + ∆
= and 
( )( ) ( )( )2 2
*
8 32 7
576
m m
B H
A c k A c k
TS
B−
− + ∆ − + ∆
=  respectively. Given the manufacturers’ solution and 
the collector’s equilibrium solution the corresponding collection rate is given by  
* *
1 2( ) ( ) 4B H B H
k
e eϕ ϕ− −
∆
= = .  
We observe that as ∆  increases *B Hid −  increases. That is, the manufacturers will increase the 
buyback price so as to encourage the collector to provide more used products to each one. From the 
collector’s perspective, the profit margin and the level of the collection efforts both increase as ∆  
increases, which is intuitive. It is also interesting to observe that the social welfare related measures 
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such as the profits and the surpluses all increase with respect to ∆ , which implies the substantial 
importance of the remanufacturing cost saving on the social welfare. 
4.3 Extended Model with Governmental Incentives and Fees 
In this section, we extend the basic model by incorporating an incentive α given to the collector per 
unit collected and a fee to the manufacturers of γ dollars per unit assembled. Figure 7 depicts the 
participation of the government through the incentives and fees in the basic model. 
 
Figure 7. Extended Model with Governmental Incentives and Fees (G) and Competition 
 
With the introduction of these incentives and fees, the basic model from the previous section is 
extended as follows. The collector’s profit expression is given by 
1 2, 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
( )( ) ( )( )CGMax q k d q k dλ λ λ λ α λ λ αΠ = − + + − +
 
Since the objective function is strictly concave in iλ  (See Appendix G), from the first order 
condition, the best unique response is given by 11 2G
d α
λ
+
= 22 2G
d α
λ
+
=
 
The manufacturers’ problem, on the other hand, is to maximize their profit over 1 1,w d  and 
2 2,w d . That is, 
Manufacturer1 Manufacturer2
Customers
Collector
Forward Product Flow
Reverse Product Flow
Government
α
γ γ
Governmental incentive/fee
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( ) ( )( )1
1 1, 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
M
q d G mMax q q c d k d qδ β θ γ λΠ = − − − − + ∆ − −  
( ) ( )( )2
2 2, 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
M
q d G mMax q q c d k d qδ β θ γ λΠ = − − − − + ∆ − −           (21)                    
It can be verified (see AppendixG) that the unique optimal equilibrium solution for (21) is: 
2 2 2 2
* 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
16 2 16 16 4 2 8 8 8 2
8( 4 )
m m
G
c k k k c k k kq β α β β γ β δ αβ β θ α θ γθ δ θ α θ θ
β β θ
− + − − ∆ − ∆ − + − + + ∆ + ∆
=
− +
2 2 2 2
* 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
16 2 16 16 4 2 8 8 8 2
32 8
m m
G
c k k k c k k kq β α β β γ β δ αβ β θ α θ γθ δ θ α θ θ
β β θ
− + − + + ∆ + ∆ + − + − − ∆ − ∆
=
−
*
1 1
1 ( )
2G
d α= ∆ − * 2 2
1 ( )
2G
d α= ∆ −
 
Let us next examine the impact of the governmental incentives and fees on the environmental 
efficiency represented by the collection rate. From our definition of the collection rate, at the 
equilibrium, the level of collection efforts is * 11 4G
e
α∆ +
= and * 22 4G
e
α∆ +
= and the corresponding 
collection rate is given by * 1Gϕ  11 4
k α∆ + =  
 
 and * 2Gϕ  22 4
k α∆ + =  
 
. 
Compared to the basic model’s *1Bϕ  
1
1 4
k  ∆=  
 
 and * 2Bϕ  22 4
k ∆ =  
 
, for α > 0,  the collection 
rate is strictly higher in the extended model with governmental intervention. 
The profits for the collector and the manufacturers at the equilibrium are given by  
* 2 2 4 2
2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 12
1 2
2 2
2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2
1 ( 8 ( ) ( ) 4 ( )
64(4 )
( ) (8 ( ) ( 4 4 4 ( ) ) )
( ) ( 8 ( 8 8 ( ) ) 4( ) ))
C
G m m
m
m
c k k c k
k c k
k c k
β α β α α θ
β β θ
α β γ δ γ δ α θ
α β β γ δ α γ δ θ
Π = − + ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆
−
− + ∆ − + − − + + + ∆
+ + ∆ − + − + + + ∆ + −
 
*
1
2 2 2
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 2
1 2
(2 (8 8 8 ( ) ) ( 8 8 8 ( ) ) )
64( 4 )
M m m
G
c k c kβ β γ δ α γ δ α θ
β β θ
+ − − + ∆ + − − + + + ∆
Π =
− +
 
*
2
2 2 2
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
(2 (8 8 8 ( ) ) ( 8 8 8 ( ) ) )
64( 4 )
M m m
G
c k c kβ β γ δ α γ δ α θ
β β θ
+ − − + ∆ + − − + + + ∆
Π =
− +
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Finally we have that the consumer surplus is expressed as: 
* 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 22 2
1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
2 3 2
1 1 2 1 1
1 (256 64 4
128( 4 )
512 64 256 256 512
64 512 256 128
16 128
G m m
m m
m
CS c c k k
c k c
k c k
k k
β β α β β α β β
β β θ
β β γ α β β γ β β γ β β γ β β δ
α β β δ β β γδ β β δ αβ β
α β β α
= − +
− +
+ − + + −
+ − + − ∆
+ ∆ − 2 2 2 21 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
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( ) 16 ( 8 8
m
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k c k
k k k k
k c k
k c k
β β γ αβ β δ β β
α β β β β γ β β δ αβ β
β β β β γδ β β δ β β γ δ α
β α β γ δ
∆ + ∆ − ∆
+ ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + ∆
+ ∆ − + − − − + ∆
+ + ∆ − − + + 2 21 2 1
2 2 2 3
1 2 1 1 1 1 2
2 2 2 4 2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 3
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( ) ) 64( ( )
( ) )) 16(8 8 8 ( ) )( )
64 (4 3 ) ( ) (4 3 ) 16 ( 4 ( 8
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2
m
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m
c k
c k c
k k c k
k
α β γ δ
β γ δ θ γ δ α γ δ θ
β β β θ β α β β θ β β γ
δ α β γ δ α θ γ δ α θ
+ ∆ + −
+ − + + − − + ∆ −
+ − + + ∆ − + − −
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We analyze now the incentive and fee as active decision variables for the government to maximize 
the total surplus.  
Therefore, the optimization problem now becomes 1 2
,
M M C
G G G G GMax TS CSα γ = +Π +Π +Π  with the 
equilibrium expressions for 1 2 1 2, , ,G G G Gq q d d  and 1 2,G Gλ λ  appropriately substituted into the relevant 
profit and consumer surplus expressions. Also, we impose the neutrality of revenue in this section. 
The revenue neutrality constraint is expressed as: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2( ( ) ( )) ( )q k d q k d q qλ λ α γ− + − = +  
Solving for γ gives two possible solutions: 1 C Dγ = − and 2 C Dγ = +  where  
2 2
2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 (16 6 16 6 16 8
32( )
2 16 8 2 8 8 3 3
8 4 8 4 )
m m
m m
C c k c k k
k k k c c k k
k k k k
β α β β α β β δ αβ
β β θ
β β δ αβ β θ θ α θ α θ
δ θ α θ θ δ θ α θ θ
= − − + − − − ∆ −
+ −
∆ − − ∆ − ∆ − − + + +
+ ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ + ∆
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2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
1 2
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
2 2 3
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 1 1 1
1 (( 2( ( 8 8 ( )(3 )) 8 (
32( )
)(3 )) 8 (2 ) ( 8 ( )(3 ) 8( )
( )(3 )) ) 16 ( )(16 ( ) 2 ( )
8 ( ) 2 (
m
m m
m
m
D c k k
c c k
k c k k
c k k
β δ α α β δ β α
β β θ
α β θ α α δ δ
α α θ α β β θ β α β α
α θ α
= − − + + + ∆ + ∆ + + +
+ −
∆ + ∆ + − + − + + ∆ + ∆ + + +
+ ∆ + ∆ + + − + ∆ − + ∆ −
+ ∆ − 21 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
)( ( 8 8 ( ) ) 4 ) ( )
( 16 ( 8 8 ( )(2 )) ))))
m
m
c k k
c k
β δ α δ θ α
β δ δ α α θ
+ ∆ − + + + ∆ − + + ∆
− + − + + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆
 
It is reasonable to assume that the government would prefer to maximize the total surplus with the 
minimal intervention, which implies that he can select the minimal incentive and fee that meet the 
objective of maximizing the total surplus. This approach is consistent with the one of minimal 
intrusion by the government (Skipper and Klein, 1999) With this criterion we select 1γ as the optimal 
fee to be charged.  
To illustrate the key features of the two models with heterogeneous products described so far, we 
now present a numerical example. For this example, the hypothetical values of the parameters are as 
follows: 1 2 1000δ δ= = , 1 2m mc c= = $5/unit, 1 2∆ = ∆ = $4/unit, 1 2 20β β= = , 19θ = , and 
1 2 0.45k k= = . With these parameter values, we can plot the behavior of GTS  as a function of α and 
compare it to BTS as in Figure 8.  
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Figure. 8. TS vs α for Basic Model and Extended Model with Competition 
We note that with the optimal value of α, the total surplus will increase. On the other hand, with 
any other choice of α value, it is actually possible that the total surplus will decrease with the 
governmental participation. 
Furthermore, Table 12 summarizes the resulting equilibrium values for the variables and the 
economic and environmental consequences relative to the basic model. 
Table 12. Results for Basic and Extended Model with Competition 
Model 
iλ  id  iq  α γ CΠ  iMΠ  CS TS ( )i ieϕ  
Basic 1 2 16.88 NA NA 15.19 5698.46 11112 22524.1 0.45 
Extended  -0.78 0.81 16.87 2.38 1.71 38.64 5694.81 11104.9 22533.1 0.718 
 
Relative to the basic model the collector decreases his profit margin and still increases his 
profit due to the sufficient amount of the incentive he receives. For the manufacturer, α induces a 
decrease in the buy-back price, which contributes to the decline of the profit level. For the customers, 
the overall effect of the incentives and fees is a decrease in their consumer surplus. We also note that 
1 2 3 4 5

22520
22525
22530
Total Surplus
GTS
*
BTS
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the governmental participation in this example increases the total surplus as well as the collection 
rate.  
From the previous numerical example we can also notice that the optimal α is greater than 
∆/2. This is a clear effect of the competition among manufacturers. In Chapter 3, we derived the 
optimal solution for the incentive α when the supply chain consists of only one manufacturer. In that 
case *0
2
α
∆
< < , we can see from the numerical example that in the case of two competing 
manufacturers, the optimal incentive is greater than 4 2
2 2
∆
= = which implies that competition 
increases the flexibility in α*. 
4.3.1 Homogeneous Products with Symmetric Costs  
We now revise section 4.3 for the case of homogeneous products with symmetric costs. Recall that in 
the case of homogeneous products, each firm decides only the quantity to sell, given the fact that the 
selling price should be the same, and its costs are symmetric.  
With this assumptions the objective function for the collector is expressed as  
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( )( ) ( )( )CG H q k d q k dλ λ α λ λ α−Π = − + + − +  
From concavity of the objective function the unique best response (see Appendix G) for the collector 
is the set his margins to:  11 2G H
d α
λ −
−
= 22 2G H
d α
λ −
−
=
 
As for the manufacturers their profits are expressed as 
1
1 2 1 1 1 1( ( ) ( ))MG H mA Bq Bq c d k d qγ λ−Π = − − − − + ∆ − −  
2
2 1 2 2 2 2( ( ) ( ))MG H mA Bq Bq c d k d qγ λ−Π = − − − − + ∆ − −  
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As shown in Appendix G, the unique best response is: 
2 2
* *
1 2
8 8 8 2
24
m
G H G H
A c k k kq q
B
α γ α
− −
− + − + ∆ + ∆
= =  
* *
1 2
1 ( )
2G H G H
d d α− −= = − + ∆  
The consumer surplus is expressed as 
2 2
* (8 8 8 ( ) )
288
m
G H
A c kCS
B
γ α
−
− − + + ∆
=  
Given the manufacturers’ solution and the collector’s equilibrium solution the level of collection 
efforts is * *1 2 4G H G H
e e
α
− −
∆ +
= = and the corresponding collection rate is given by * *1 2G H G Hϕ ϕ− −=  
4
k α∆ + =  
 
.  
We analyze now the incentive and fee as active decision variables for the government to maximize 
the total surplus.  
As in previous section the optimization problem for the government becomes
1 2
,
M M C
G H G H G H G H G HMax TS CSα γ − − − − −= +Π +Π +Π  with the revenue neutrality constraint
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2( ( ) ( )) ( )q k d q k d q qλ λ α γ− + − = + which can be simplified as 
1 ( )
4
kγ α α= + ∆
 
We have now the total surplus 
(32( ) ( 7 )( ))(8( ) ( )( ))
576
m m
G H
A c k A c kTS
B
α α α α
−
− − − ∆ +∆ − − −∆ + ∆
=
 
The first order necessary condition leads to a unique optimal α* as shown in Appendix H. We again 
rely on indirect bounds of α*. Specifically, we show in Appendix H that 0 < α* < 3
5
∆
. This implies 
that 0 < γ* < 
26
25
k∆
 while * 2( ) ( )
4 5iG H
k kϕ −
∆ ∆
< < . This in turn implies that the optimal collection 
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rate is strictly greater than that in the basic model *( ( ))
4iB
kϕ ∆= . As for the economic efficiency 
measured in total surplus, G HTS −  = ( )*G HTS α−  > BTS  as shown in Appendix I. 
Therefore, in so far as the collection rate as well as the economic efficiency measured by the 
total surplus level, the governmental participation through the incentive and fee is well justified in the 
case for homogeneous products with symmetric cost relative to the basic model without the 
governmental participation. 
For the extended model and the basic model with homogeneous products, the profits and 
consumer surplus are compared as follows: , i iM MC CG H B H G H B H− − − −Π > Π Π < Π , and G H B HCS CS− −<  
(see Appendix I). This means that the manufacturers and the customers are better off without the 
governmental participation. However, the collector increases his profit with the optimal levels of the 
incentive and fee. As in the case with no competition we can provide a lump sum payment to the 
manufacturer and customer to encourage them to participate in this scheme. 
4.3.2  Multiple Manufacturers 
We consider the case for the homogeneous product and symmetric costs when we have n 
manufacturers that compete in a Cournot-game.  
The objective function for the collector is expressed as: 
1
( )( )
i
n
C
M i i i i
i
Max q k dλ λ λ α
=
Π = − +∑
 
Since the objective function is concave in iλ  the unique optimal solution is 2
i
Mi
d α
λ
−
=
Manufacturer i maximize  
1
( ) ( )i
n
M
M i m i i i i
i
A B q c d k d qγ λ
=
 
Π = − − − + ∆ − − 
 
∑  
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It can be seen that the unique optimal solution to the variables are: 
  
( )1
2Mi
d α= ∆ −
 and 
2 28 8 8 2
8( 1)
m
Mi
c k A k kq
n B
α γ α− + − + + ∆ + ∆
=
+
 
The corresponding expression for the consumer surplus, total surplus and collection rate is expressed 
as 
2
1 1 1 12
n n n n
M i i i i
i i i i
BCS A q q A B q q
= = = =
   
= − − −   
   
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
2 2
2
8 8 2 2 3
128 1
m m
M
A c k n n A c k n
TS
B n
α α α− + ∆ − + − − + ∆ − ∆ − ∆
=
+
 
( )
4iM i
e k αϕ ∆ +=
 
As in Chapter 3, the analysis of the optimal α relies on bounds. 
Proposition 5. In the case with homogeneous products and symmetric cost where there are n 
manufacturers that compete in a Cournot-game, the bounds for the optimal incentive is 
* 10
3M
n
n
α
+ < < ∆ + 
so when n →∞ *0 Mα< < ∆  
From Proposition 5 (see proof in Appendix J), we observe that as the number of competitors in the 
supply chain increases, the upper bound for the optimal α also increases, however, the government the 
incentive should never be set equal to the remanufacturing savings ∆. Let us now compare the models 
with homogeneous products and symmetric cost described so far with a numerical example. For this 
example, the parameters are as follows: 100A = , 
m
c = $5/unit, ∆ = $4/unit, 0.05B = , and 0.45k =
. With these parameter values, we can plot the behavior of  GTS  as a function of α, and
*
BTS  and 
compare its behavior. The graph is shown in Figure 9 
 Figure 9. TS for Basic and
 
As we can see from Fig. 9, the total surplus under both the free market and the linear incentive and 
fee is improved with competition. We also notice that the optimal incentive 
 Extended Model with Homogeneous Products
α* increases as the 
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number of competitors increases and it tends to ∆ as n →∞ . The government should be aware of the 
increase in the size of the program as the incentive that must be given will increase.  
4.4 Centrally Coordinated Model: Extended Model  
We now analyze the problem  from a social planner’s perspective. Specifically, we assume that there 
exists a social planner who centrally coordinates the forward and the reverse flows of products so as 
to maximize the total surplus. This leads to the upper bound of the total surplus that is theoretically 
achievable denoted by *CCTS .  
From the social planner’s perspective, he wants to maximize 
2 1M MC
CCTS CS= Π +Π +Π +
 
Hence, the total surplus under the central coordination is: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 ( (2 2 2 ( )) (2 2 2 ( ) 2 ))
2CC m m
TS q c q e k e q c q e k e qβ δ β δ θ= − + − + −∆ − + − + −∆ + We 
note that, with the social planner as the sole decision maker, the quantity to sell iq  and the cost of 
collection efforts ie  are the only relevant variables in his maximization of CCTS . It can be verified 
(see Appendix K) that the unique optimal solution is:  
2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
4 4 4 4
4( )
m m
CC
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− − ∆ − + + ∆
=
− +
 
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
4 4 4 4
4( )
m m
CC
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− + + ∆ + − − ∆
=
−
1
1 2
e
∆
= 22 2
e
∆
=
 
which implies a maximal theoretical upper bound for the total surplus of 
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
2
1 2
( 4 4 ) (4 4 )(4 (4 ) 2( 4 4 ) )
32( )
m m m m
CC
c k c k c k c kTS β δ δ β β δ δ θ
β β θ
− + + ∆ + − − ∆ − + ∆ + − + + ∆
=
−
while the corresponding optimal collection rate is given by *
2i
i
CC kϕ
∆
=  
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4.4.1 Centrally Coordinated Model: Homogeneous products with symmetric cost 
Let us now revise the model described in previous section for the case of homogeneous products with 
symmetric cost.   
From the social planner’s perspective, he wants to maximize 
2 2
21 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 22 2CC H m m
Bq BqTS Aq c q e kq Aq c q e kq Bq q e kq e kq− = − − − + − − − − + ∆ + ∆  
We note that, with the social planner as the sole decision maker, the quantity to sell iq  and the cost of 
collection efforts ie  are the only relevant variables in his maximization of CC HTS − . As for the effort 
the unique optimal solution (see Appendix K)  is: 1 2 2CC H CC H
e e− −
∆
= = As for the quantity to sell, the 
social planner is not interested in iq separately, since the products are perfect substitutes any linear 
combination that results in 
2
1 2
4 4
4
m
A c kq q
B
− + ∆
+ =  will maximize CC HTS − . 
The optimal values for e and 1 2q q+  implies a maximal theoretical upper bound for the total surplus 
of 
2 2
* (4 4 )
32
m
CC H
A c kTS
B−
− + ∆
= while the corresponding optimal collection rate is given by 
*
2i
i
CC H kϕ −
∆
=  
Proposition 6. For the models with homogeneous products and symmetric cost, the relationship 
among the levels of the total surpluses and the levels of the collection rates are given by 
* * *
CC H G H B HTS TS TS− − −> >  and 
* * *
i i iCC H G H B H
ϕ ϕ ϕ− − −> > .    
From Proposition 6 (see proof Appendix K), we see that the centrally coordinated model 
increases the total surplus and the collection rate relative to the basic and extended model. We can 
now provide a set of instruments that will achieve *CC HTS − and 
*
iCC H
ϕ −  
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Let us introduce the following financial instruments ofα , ε, and F .  
α : incentive given to the collector per unit collected  
 ε: fee/ incentive that is charged/provided to the manufacturer per unit sold  
F : fixed fee that is charged to the manufacturer to enter the market.  
It can be shown that the conditions under which ε can be an incentive or fee are determined by 
the parameters ,k ∆ , and cm . 
The scheme proposed consists on a two-part fee which can be found in the literature for coordination 
of the supply chain (De Borger, 2001) 
Proposition 7. Theoretical total surplus 
2 2
* (4 4 )
32
m
CC H
A c kTS
B−
− + ∆
= can be achieved with ,α ε and F
defined as follows: α = ∆ , ( )( )21 48 mA c kε = − − + ∆  and 
( )( ) ( )( )2 24 4 3
64
m mA c k A c kF
B
− +∆ − + ∆
=  
It can be shown (see Appendix K) that the scheme defined in Proposition 7 achieves *CC HTS −  
Table 13 summarizes the levels of profits and surpluses as well as the corresponding decision 
variables for the allocation mechanism described above. 
Table 13. Results for the New Scheme of Incentives and Fees in the Model with Competition 
 Objective Function Decision Variable(s) 
Collector’s profit ( )( )2 24
16
mC k A c k
B
∆ − + ∆
Π =  2i
λ
∆
= −  
Manufacturers’ 
profit 
( )( )2 24
32
i mM
k A c k
B
∆ − + ∆
Π = −  ( )( )2
1 4
8i m
q A c k
B
= − +∆   
0id =  
Consumer 
Surplus ( )( )
224
32
mA c kCS
B
− + ∆
=  
N/A 
 Total Surplus 2 2(4( ) )
32
mA c kTS
B
− + ∆
=  
N/A 
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We now present a numerical example that illustrates the key features of the proposed allocation 
mechanisms. For this example, the hypothetical values of the parameters are as follows: A = 1,000, 
m
c = $5/unit,  = $4/unit, B = 20, and k = 0.45. Given these data, 4α = ∆ = , 12465F = , and 
496.6ε = − . This leads to Table 14, which summarizes the results for all variables, profits, and 
surpluses. 
Table 14. Results of the Numerical Example for the Alternative Incentives and Fees in the Model 
with Competition. 
α
 F  ε  q d λ  ( )eϕ  
 
ΠM  
 
ΠC  CS TS 
4 12465 -496.6 24.92 0 -2 0.9 -44.856 89.712   24890.3 24840.3 
 
Given Table 14, the increase in total surplus 2785TS∆ =  and the ratio of improvement with 
respect to the basic model is 0.1262. To induce the manufacturers’ optimal behavior a lump sum of 
$6250.72 each that can be financed with a lump sum payment of $72.89 and $12428.54 from the 
collector and representative customer respectively. Similar approaches in the use of a lump sum 
payment or fee can be seen in Zhao and Wang (2002) and Kim and El Ouardighi (2007).  
After the lump sum payment are given to the manufacturers, we can see that each member of 
the supply chain increases his profit in 12.62% 
4.4.3  Approximation for Extended Model 
With the results obtained for the centrally coordinated model with homogeneous products and 
symmetric cost, we approximate the incentives and fees defined before to capture the differentiation 
between firms.  
Let approximate the parameters as 1 2
2
A δ δ+= 1 2
2
B β β+= 1 2
2
m m
c c
cm
+
= 1 2
2
k kk +=
1 2
2
∆ + ∆
∆ =  
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The approximate incentives and fees that will be applied to the extended model with governmental 
intervention are: 
1 2
2
α
∆ + ∆ ′ =  
 
2
1 21 2 1 2 1 21
' 4
8 2 2 2 2
m mc c k kδ δε
  + + ∆ + ∆ +      = − − +                 
and 
( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1
1 1
' 3 3
8 8
F k kρ α ε ρ α ε   = ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ +   
   
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We now compare the efficiency that can be achieved with the approximation for the incentives and 
fees described previously (i.e. α’, ε’ and F’) 
We define the ratio as the quotient between the 
approxTS (the TS that is achieved with α’, ε’ and F’) 
and *CCTS  (the theoretical upper bound). 
Because of the complexity of the expression, we analyze the ratio with numerical examples. The 
hypothetical parameters values are 1 2 1000δ δ= = 1 2 20β β= = 1 2 5m mc c= = 1 2 0.45k k= =
1 2 3∆ = ∆ = 10θ =  
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Figure 10 shows the change in ratio when the manufacturers differ only with respect to the 
remanufacture savings. 
 
Figure 10. Ratio vs ∆2 
 
Figure 11. Ratio vs β2 
In Figure 11 we show the behavior of the ratio when the manufacturers differ only in parameter β. We 
notice that, in this case, the effect of changing β is not symmetric, as oppose to the case of the 
remanufacture savings. 
Figures 12 and 13 show the change in the ratio when the manufacturers are not symmetric in k and δ 
respectively. Again, we notice that the change in k produces a symmetric behavior for the ratio, will 
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changing a parameter in the inverse demand function produces a different effect as it increases or 
decreases. 
 
Figure 12. Ratio vs k2 
 
Figure 13. Ratio vs δ2 
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From the numerical examples we see that as the parameters become symmetric the ratio increases. 
This is intuitively since, as the parameters become symmetric, we are approximating the case of 
homogeneous products with symmetric cost. Conversely, as the parameters become more different the 
ratio decreases which implies that the 
approx CCTS TS<<   
We can see that, although the approximation of financial instruments does not achieve the theoretical 
upper bound, it can still increase the total surplus in cases where the manufacturers are similar in their 
cost structure and the products that they sell. 
4.5 Discussion of the Results 
In the case of multiple manufacturers, the similarity of the products and the firms represent a major 
aspect to considerate. Governmental incentives and fees must account these differences since a 
uniform incentive can be less effective as the companies are less similar.  
As the number of competitors increases, the flexibility of the incentive also increases. However, it is 
important to notice that the incentive provided has a limit, even though the number of competitors 
increases up to infinity.  
The numerical analysis presented in this chapter and in previous one, where derived with hypothetical 
data. Further analysis must be done with real data, to derive conclusions for particular supply chains.  
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5. Extension to Some Current Policies Mexico 
 
According to the study “Diagnóstico sobre la generación de basura electrónica en México”, 
each year Mexico generates between 150,000 and 180,000 tons of electronic waste (Urgen a controlar 
basura electrónica, 2008). Although there have been juridical and environmental efforts in the subject, 
Mexico still does not have a regulation in this matter.The country does not have clear politics of how 
to recover, recycle or remanufacture the electronic waste. Just a small percentage of the televisions, 
sound systems, computers or cellular phones that are discarded in the country goes through controlled 
process for their recycle or remanufacture. Approximately only 5 percent is recycle when most of the 
products can be reuse or recycle up to 100% (Organizan Reciclón Querétaro 2009) 
A major reason for this low collection rate is that there are few companies in Mexico that can 
accept this waste for further use. For example, HP has a program for collecting their products at the 
end of their life that is currently operating in USA, Europe and China, but there is no program 
implemented in Mexico (Green Peace México). The environmental law that is active and that 
attempts to control the e-waste generation is Ley General para la prevención y gestión integral de los 
residuos 2007. This law classifies the electronic waste in the group of waste of special treatment. 
However there is no specific scheme that defines the responsibility of each member of the supply 
chain in the recovery of the products.  
In the case of Mexico, our findings suggest that: 
a. There is a need of an environmental law that clearly defines the responsibility of each 
member of the supply chain, in order to actually improve the collection rate and the economic 
efficiency. Little can be done to analyze the effect of such incentives and fees, if there is no clear 
definition of who is responsible of what. 
b. As shown in Chapter 3, there is the possibility that the governmental participation can be 
useless if there is a high fixed cost for the collector and/or the manufacturer. This is probably the case 
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for Mexico, since there is no structure for the reverse flow (Román, 2007). The government must 
analyze the characteristics of a particular supply chain to see if the approach presented in this paper is 
appropriated or there is a need of alternative incentives that will first make viable the supply chain 
and then improve the economic efficiency.  
c. The case of the unprofitable collector is very plausible in the context of Mexico’s culture. The 
current collection rates are low, since there is no participation of the customers. An analysis of the 
variables that affect the collection rate should be done in order to fully understand the behavior of the 
customers and derive appropriate guidelines. A possible approximation for the current collection rates 
can be model in a dynamic model which might me able to capture the dynamics of the market and the 
behavior of the customers. 
d. The government must quantify the economic benefit of the reusing the electronic waste to be 
in position of setting the values of the optimal incentives and fees. 
e. About the scheme of incentives and fees, through this study we show that a linear approach 
can improve the economic efficiency and the collection rate. Although there are alternative schemes 
that could provide better results, since the linear incentives are quite intuitive, our suggestion is that it 
could be used as a first approach. 
f. As discuss in section 3.10, the cost of managing the incentives and fees can be quite complex 
to account for. This is a particular problem in the context of Mexico, since our governmental 
structures have shown incapability of managing other kinds of taxations. 
g. A uniform incentive and fee can increase the efficiency of the supply chain and could allow 
companies to start developing their network structure for collection. So an approach of letting each 
state implement its own scheme could generate more economic and logistics complications for the 
members of the supply chain. 
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6. Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
In this paper, we have investigated the economic efficiency of a series of CLSC’s subject to 
the governmental participation via incentives and fees. Specifically, this study had the following 
research objectives: 
 (1) To analyze the impact of governmental participation via incentives and fees in the economic 
efficiency of a closed-loop supply chain. 
(2) To investigate alternative mechanism that can improve the economic efficiency of a closed-loop 
supply chain. 
(3) To analyze the impact of competition among manufacturers in the economic efficiency of a 
closed-loop supply chain with governmental participation. 
To achieve these objectives first, we formulated and analyzed a basic model of a CLSC 
consisting of a manufacturer/remanufacturer, customers, and a collector for a product of a single kind 
in a Stackelberg game. We then extended the basic model by incorporating fairly large classes of 
governmental incentives and fees in a single modeling framework, and showed how the government 
could determine the optimal levels of the incentives and fees that would maximize the total surplus 
under the revenue neutrality requirement. Next, we revisited the extended model from a social planner 
perspective of central coordination, and showed how the theoretical upper bound of the total surplus 
could be achieved utilizing three financial instruments, and presented the allocation and distribution 
mechanisms for the centrally coordinated model. In addition, we derived the quantitative conditions 
under which the government participation induces an entry or prevents an exit of a CLSC when one 
or two members of the CLSC are unprofitable. Moreover, through the revenue-sharing contract 
model, we showed how the economic efficiency compared to the basic model improves without the 
government participation and how the collection rate is greater than or equal to that in any other 
model. However, we note that when one or two members of a CLSC are unprofitable, it is difficult to 
imagine that a revenue-sharing contract induces an entry or prevents an exit as the credibility of the 
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government far exceeds that of an unprofitable supply chain member. We also note that, even though 
the revenue-sharing contract maximizes the sum of the member profits, the corresponding economic 
efficiency is strictly less than that in the centrally coordinated model with the alternative financial 
instruments (in fact, it can be verified that the revenue-sharing contract achieves at most 75% of the 
theoretically maximal economic efficiency). 
 In addition, we note that there may be aforementioned distributive challenges when the 
models of the government participation and the revenue-sharing contract are implemented. e.g., in 
some cases, taxes and rebates could influence the customers’ purchase decisions. We also note that, 
conceptually, by taking a representative customer approach (see e.g., Mas-Colell (1995); cf. the 
assumption of the numerous customers in our paper), the narrative and exposition could be simplified. 
On the other hand, the challenges in practice will more or less remain the same. Additional challenges 
in implementing relatively sophisticated contracts such as the information requirements are 
extensively illustrated in Cachon and Lariviere (2005). 
To investigate the impact of competition, we formulated and analyzed a basic model of a CLSC 
consisting of two manufacturers/remanufacturer, customers, and a collector for two products of a 
single kind in a Stackelberg-Cournot game. We extended the basic model by incorporating a scheme 
of governmental incentives and fees and examined the implications of the governmental intervention. 
We then analyze the symmetric case for the firms, where the manufacturers sell a homogeneous 
product that is indistinguishable to the customer. With this model we showed how the government 
could determine the optimal levels of the incentives and fees that would maximize the total surplus 
under the revenue neutrality requirement. Next, we revisited the model of homogeneous products in 
the case of multiple manufacturers with symmetric costs. Finally, we analyze the models from a 
social planner perspective of central coordination, and showed how the theoretical upper bound of the 
total surplus for the symmetric case could be achieved utilizing three financial instruments and 
present a numerical analysis for the case of heterogeneous products. 
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There are a multiple number of critical managerial insights and economic implications relevant 
to the academics and practitioners including policy and decision makers of governmental incentives 
and fees for environmental purposes on one or more members of CLSC’s: 
(1) Relative to the basic model of a free market CLSC, the extended model clearly demonstrates that 
the linear incentives and fees can improve the economic efficiency and collection rate. Also, in the 
extended model, the economic and environmental consequences of the profits, surpluses, and the 
collection rate are independent of the fractions which determine how much each party would receive 
incentives and/or pay fees. Hence, for example, the policy and decision makers can focus on 
improving the economic efficiency and collection rate, and perhaps leave the fractions to a political 
settlement. On the other hand, we note that if the governmental incentives and fees are not at the 
optimal level, there is no guarantee that the economic efficiency is improved. In fact, the total surplus 
level of the basic model can be strictly greater than that of the extended model with non-optimal 
levels of incentives and fees. 
(2) Theoretically, it is quite possible to achieve the upper bound of the total surplus by utilizing a 
combination of conventional as well as more creative financial instruments. In such a case, the 
allocation mechanism is straightforward in theory. On the other hand, in practice, the distribution 
mechanism could become a challenge as a community that includes the customers may not be 
amenable to a lump sum tax. 
(3) For a given range of the fixed costs, the government will be able to induce an entry of a new 
CLSC or prevent an exit of an existing CLSC under the extended model. Furthermore, the 
applicability of the governmental participation for inducing entries and preventing exits with respect 
to Ck
 
at given Mk (or Mk at given Ck ) increases with ∆  and k . This implies that when the 
government aims to induce an entry of a new CLSC or prevent an exit of an existing CLSC, the 
accurate estimation of ∆  and k will be highly critical. In the case of smaller∆  and/or k , the 
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governmental participation may not be enough to induce an entry or prevent an exit, making such 
governmental efforts ineffective. 
(4) Although the manufacturer and the collector can agree on a coordination mechanism such as a 
revenue sharing contract without any governmental participation, this contract can only achieve the 
maximum total profit of the supply chain, but not the maximum total surplus of the CLSC. 
(5) In the case, where multiple manufacturers, the upper bound for the optimal incentive increases as 
the number of manufacturers increase. This implies that the government must provide more flexibility 
in the setting of the optimal incentives and fees as the competition increases. However, with the 
scheme of intervention described, the government should not provide an incentive higher than the 
remanufacturing savings.  
(6) In the case of heterogeneous products, there is no straightforward derivation of the optimal 
financial instruments, since a uniform incentive and fee would not be able to achieve the theoretical 
upper bound. So the government must analyze different approximations in order to improve as much 
as possible the economic efficiency and collection rate.  
To our knowledge, this study is the first paper that, in the context of CLSC’s, game-
theoretically models the governmental participation via active and somewhat creative pricing of 
incentives and fees, and analyzes the economic and environmental impacts. As such, there are 
numerous opportunities for further studies. For example, a study of relaxing one or more of the 
simplifying assumptions is also desirable as it could generalize our findings and expand their 
applicability. Some other environmental measures can be incorporated to reinforce the environmental 
impact of governmental incentives and fess. The assumption that customers make no distinction 
between new and remanufactured products can be relaxed by treating them as imperfect substitute 
products. An analysis of a two period game can be used for this relaxation, perhaps with the use of 
simulation. The assumption that the demand and the collection rate functions, as well as the structure 
of the incentives and fees, are linear can also be relaxed by considering various nonlinear 
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relationships such as a polynomial function of a higher degree or an exponential/natural log function. 
Further analysis can be done to analyze the government’s problem focusing in the collection rate (i.e. 
maximize collection rate) .In this paper the remanufacturing savings are the main driver for collection 
the used products, different analysis must be done to consider the case where ∆ is negative.  
This study analytically and quantitatively demonstrates that the governmental incentives and 
fees have major impacts on CLSC’s from both economic and environmental perspectives. 
Accordingly, it is hoped that the government will make deliberate and purposeful choices of the kinds 
of financial instruments to be utilized and the levels of incentives and fees to each member of 
CLSC’s. 
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Appendix A. Concavity and Optimality of Profit Functions in Basic and Extended Model 
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Appendix B. Expression for *α , its Uniqueness and Bounds 
 
For the extended model described in Section 3.3.3, with the help of Mathematica, we have: 
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As for the uniqueness of *α , we exploit the polynomial properties of the quartic objective function 
and the cubic equation for the FONC. That is, as 1) ETS
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By our definition, α is an incentive given to the collector/manufacturer. Hence, 0α ≥ (Also, if the 
optimal incentive α* is negative, we risk the collection rate (i.e. ( )
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k α + ∆ ) to become negative). In 
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the results of the first order conditions at 0,
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Appendix C.  Relationships among the Total Surpluses and the Collection Rates of Basic, 
Extended, Alternative Financial Instruments, and Revenue-Sharing Contract Models 
Throughout Appendix C, let mA cδ β= − and 
2B kβ= ∆ . For * * * *B E RSC AFITS TS TS TS< < <  
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For the collection rate * * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )B E AFI RSCe e e eϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ< < =  
(i)To prove that * *( ) ( )E Be eϕ ϕ> , we need
*
4 4
k kα ∆ + ∆ >   
  
. From Appendix B, * 0α > . Hence, 
* *( ) ( )E Be eϕ ϕ> . 
(ii)To prove that * *( ) ( )AFI Ee eϕ ϕ> , we need
*
2 4
k k α ∆ ∆ +  >   
   
. From Appendix B, *
2
α
∆
< . 
Hence, *
3( )
8E
e kϕ ∆< , and * *( ) ( )AFI Ee eϕ ϕ> .  
From (i) and (ii), and since * *( ) ( )AFI RSCe eϕ ϕ= , we have
 
* * * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )B E AFI RSCe e e eϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ< < = . 
85 
 
Appendix D. Relationships among Collector Profits, Manufacturer Profits, and Consumer 
Surpluses for Basic, Extended, Alternative Financial Instrument, and Revenue-Sharing 
Contract Models 
 
Throughout Appendix D, let mA cδ β= − and 
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(iii) * *C CAFI RSCΠ ≤ Π : For 
* *C C
AFI RSCΠ ≤ Π , we have
2 2
1
16 24 7
64M C
A AB Bk k k
β
− −
≤ + =
 
(iv) * * *C C CE RSC AFIΠ ≤ Π < Π : We now address the case where 
* *C C
RSC AFIΠ < Π , but 
* *C C
E RSCΠ ≤ Π . From 
(iii) we know that if 
2 216 24 7
64M C
A AB Bk k
β
− −
> + , then 
* *C C
RSC AFIΠ <Π . Hence, we will focus on 
solving the inequality, 
* *C C
E RSCΠ ≤ Π . After simplification, we have 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
* *2 22
2
84
64 128M C
k A kA B
k k k
α β α
β
+ ∆ − −∆+
≤ − + = . It can be verified that 2 1k k>  by 
utilizing a minimum bound produced at 2α
∆= .  
(v) * * *C C CB RSC EΠ < Π < Π : We now address the case where 
* *C C
RSC EΠ < Π , but 
* *C C
B RSCΠ < Π . From (iv) 
we know that if 2Mk k> , then 
* *C C
RSC EΠ <Π . Hence, we will focus on solving inequality 
* *C C
B RSCΠ < Π . After simplification, we have 
2 2
1
32 8
128M C
A AB Bk k L
β
+ +
< + = . From our 
assumption of nonnegative profit for the manufacturer in the basic model we have an upper bound for 
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( )2
3
8
256M
A B
k k
β
+
≤ = . We can show that 1 3L k> since this implies showing that 
2 2 232 8 (8 )
128 256C C
A AB B A Bk k
β β
+ + +
+ < + . This is equivalent to 2 256 0CB kβ+ >  after 
simplification. Hence, for 0Ck ≥ , we have 1 3L k> , which implies that the upper bound for Mk is 3k
.Since the upper bound for Mk is 3k and not 1L , 
* *C C
B RSCΠ = Π cannot occur.  
To prove that 3 2k k> , after simplification and using the approximation at 2
α
∆
= , we need 
3
(160 )
2048c
B A Bk L
β
+
< = . From our assumption of nonnegative profit in the basic model for the 
collector we have 4
(8 )
256c
B A Bk L
β
+
< = . It can be verified that 3 4L L> under our assumption that 
A B> (i.e. ( )2 mk cδ β> ∆ + ). Hence,  Ck  < 3L , implying 3 2k k> . 
 We note that the relationship among the four profits of the manufacturer can be proven with 
the steps and techniques we just utilized for the collector’s relationship. 
For consumer surplus, we want to show that * * * *E B RSC AFICS CS CS CS< < <  
 (vi) * *E BCS CS<  : 
( )( ) ( )
222 * 22
* *
8 8
512 512E B
A k A k
CS CS
β α β
β β
+ ∆ − + ∆
= < =  since * 0α > . 
(vii) * *RSCBCS CS< : 
* * (16 3 ) 0
512BRSC
B A BCS CS
β
+
− = > , implying * *
BRSC
CS CS> . 
(viii) * *
AFI RSC
CS CS> : 
2
* * 3(4 ) 0
128AFI RSC
A BCS CS
β
+
− = > , implying * *
AFI RSC
CS CS> . 
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Appendix E. Optimality of the Total Surplus Function in Centrally Coordinated Model and 
Derivation of Financial Instruments 
For CCTS , we have ( )( ) 0CC m
TS
c e ke w
w
β
∂
= + − ∆ − =
∂
and ( ) ( )2 0CCTS w k e
e
δ β
∂
= − ∆ − =
∂
. 
The only solution that satisfies the FONC’s is 
24
4
m
CC
c k
w
− ∆
=  and 
2CC
e
∆
= . For the SOSC’s, we 
have 
2
2
CCTS
w
β
∂
= −
∂
< 0 and ( )
2
2 2
CCTS k w
e
δ β
∂
= − −
∂
 < 0. At *
2CC
e
∆
= , 
22 2
2 2
CC CC CCTS TS TS
w e w e
  ∂ ∂ ∂ >    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
 is met because ( )2 0k wβ δ β− > . Hence, 
24
4
m
CC
c k
w
− ∆
=
2CC
e
∆
=  is the unique optimal solution. 
Derivation of the incentives and fees for the allocation mechanism 
The collector’s profit function is expressed as ( )( ) ( )CAM Cw x k d kδ β λ α λΠ = − + − − , and the 
unique best response is 
 
λAM =
d −αx
2
. Given 
 
λAM , the manufacturer’s profit maximizing problem 
becomes ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1
2
M
AM m M
d xMax w w c d x k d w w kαδ β η α δ β ε −  Π = − − − + ∆− + − − − − −  
  
. From 
0
M
AM
d
∂Π
∂ = , we have 
( )1 2
2A M
x
d
α∆ + −
= . Hence, 
4AM
e
α + ∆
= . To satisfy the first 
requirement (
 
eAM
* = eCC
* =
∆
2
), we set AMα = ∆ . For the second requirement, we need * *AM CCw w=  . 
With ( )* 2
2AM
x
λ
∆ − ∆
=  and *A Md x= ∆ − ∆ , the first order condition leads to the unique solution 
( )
( )
28 8 8 4
16 1AM
mc kw
δ β βη δε β
β ε
− + − + + ∆
−
= . Hence, the second requirement is:                            
( )
( )
( )
2
28 8 8 4 1 4
16 1 4
m
m
c k
c k
δ β βη δε β
β ε
− + − + + ∆
= − ∆
−
. The last requirement of the revenue 
neutrality implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1w xk d w x k d w w wδ β α λ δ β α λ δ β η δ β ε− − + − − − = − + − . By simultaneous 
solution of the last two expressions with respect to η  and ε , we have:                                         
( ) ( )
( )
2 4 2
2
3 5 4
4
m m m
AM
m
k c k c c
c k
δ β β δ β
η
δ β β
∆ − + ∆ − −
=
− + ∆
 and ( )
( ) 2
4
2
4
m
AM
m
c
c k
δ β
ε
δ β β
−
= −
− + ∆
 
Hence, with the values of α , η , and ε specified as above, the pricing of the incentives and fees for 
the allocation mechanism is complete. 
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Appendix F. Concavity and Optimality of the Forward only Supply Chain and the Revenue-
Sharing Contract Model 
For Forward Only Supply Chain: For MFΠ  to be strictly concave in w , we need 
2
2 0
M
Fd
dw
Π
< . 
2
2 2
M
Fd
dw
β
Π
= −  < 0.  
For Revenue-Sharing Contract: For TP , we have ( )( )2 0m
TP
c e e k w
w
δ β
∂
= + + − ∆ − =
∂
and 
( ) ( )( ) 0TP w e k ek
e
δ β
∂
= − ∆ − − =
∂
. The only solution that satisfies the FONC’s is 
( ) 2* 4
8
m
TP
c k
w
δ β β
β
+ − ∆
= and  *
2TP
e
∆
= . For the SOSC’s, we have 
2
2 2
TP
w
β
∂
= −
∂
< 0 and 
( )
2
2 2
TP k w
e
δ β
∂
= − −
∂
 < 0. At *
2TP
e
∆
= , 
22 2
2 2
TP TP TP
w e w e
  ∂ ∂ ∂ >    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
 is met because 
( )2 0k wβ δ β− > . Hence, ( )
2
*
4
8
m
TP
c k
w
δ β β
β
+ − ∆
=  and *
2TP
e
∆
= are the unique optimal 
equilibrium solution. 
For CRSCΠ  to be strictly concave in e , we need 
2
2 0
C
RSCd
de
Π
< . ( )
2
2 2
C
RSCd k w
de
χ δ β
Π
= − −  < 0.  
For MRSCΠ  to be strictly concave in w , we need 
2
2 0
M
RSCd
dw
Π
< . ( )
2
2 2 1
M
RSCd
dw
β χ
Π
= − −  < 0. 
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Appendix G. Concavity and Optimality of Profit Functions in Basic and Extended Model with 
Competition 
 
For Basic Model: 
For 
 
ΠB
C
 to be strictly concave in 1λ and 2λ , we need (i) 
2
2
1
0
C
B
λ
∂ Π
<
∂
, (ii) 
2
2
2
0
C
B
λ
∂ Π
<
∂
, and (iii) 
det(H)>0, where H is the hessian matrix. Now, 
2
1 12
1
2 0
C
B k q
λ
∂ Π
= − <
∂
since 1 0k > and we asume 
positive demand. Likewise, 
2
2 22
2
2 0
C
B k q
λ
∂ Π
= − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand and 2 0k > . For 
condition (iii), we calculate the determinant of the Hessian matrix which results in 
( ) 1 2 1 24 0Det H k k q q= > from the previous assumptions. For the solution of the Cournot-game, we 
need to solve first order necessary conditions simultaneously for both manufacturers.  The only 
solution that satisfies the first order necessary conditions and does not violate our assumption of the 
positive demand is 
2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
16 16 2 8 8
,
8( 4 )
m m
B
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− − ∆ − + + ∆
=
− +
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
16 16 2 8 8
,
32 8
m m
B
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− + + ∆ + − − ∆
=
−
1
1 2B
d ∆= and 22 2B
d ∆=  
To verify the second order sufficient conditions for manufacturer 1, we need (i) 
2 1
2
1
0
M
B
q
∂ Π
<
∂
, (ii) 
2 1
2
1
0
M
B
d
∂ Π
<
∂
, and (iii) 
22 1 2 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
M M M
B B B
q d q d
    ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂Π
>    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 Conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfy since 
2 1
12
1
2 0
M
B
q
β
∂ Π
= − <
∂
and 
2 1
1 12
1
0
M
B k q
d
∂ Π
= − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand. Condition (iii) is 
expressed as ( )
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
12 ( 2 )
2
k q k dβ  > ∆ − 
 
. At 11 2B
d ∆= , condition (iii) can be expressed as 
( )1 1 12 0k qβ > , which holds since we assume the positive demand and 1 1, 0kβ > . To verify the 
second order sufficient conditions for manufacturer 2, we need (i) 
2 2
2
2
0
M
B
q
∂ Π
<
∂
, (ii) 
2 2
2
2
0
M
B
d
∂ Π
<
∂
, and 
(iii) 
22 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
M M M
B B B
q d q d
    ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂Π
>    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 Conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfy since 
2 2
22
2
2 0
M
B
q
β
∂ Π
= − <
∂
and 
2 2
2 22
2
0
M
B k q
d
∂ Π
= − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand. Condition (iii) is expressed as 
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( )
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
12 ( 2 )
2
k q k dβ  > ∆ − 
 
. At 22 2B
d ∆= , condition (iii) can be expressed as ( )2 2 22 0k qβ > , 
which holds since we assume the positive demand and 2 2, 0kβ > . 
Hence, 
2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
16 16 2 8 8
,
8( 4 )
m m
B
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− − ∆ − + + ∆
=
− +
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
16 16 2 8 8
,
32 8
m m
B
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− + + ∆ + − − ∆
=
−
1
1 2B
d ∆= and 22 2B
d ∆=  
are the unique optimal equilibrium solution. 
For Basic Model with homogeneous products: 
For CB H−Π  to be strictly concave in 1λ and 2λ , we need (i) 
2
2
1
0
C
B H
λ
−∂ Π <
∂
, (ii) 
2
2
2
0
C
B H
λ
−∂ Π <
∂
, and (iii) 
det(H)>0, where H is the hessian matrix. Now, 
2
12
1
2 0
C
B H kq
λ
−∂ Π = − <
∂
since 0k > and we asume 
positive demand. Likewise, 
2
22
2
2 0
C
B H kq
λ
−∂ Π = − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand and 2 0k > . 
For condition (iii), we calculate the determinant of the Hessian matrix which results in 
( ) 2 1 24 0Det H k q q= > from the previous assumptions. For the solution of the Cournot-game among 
manufacturers, we need to solve first order necessary conditions simultaneously for both 
manufacturers.  The only solution that satisfies the first order necessary conditions and does not 
violate our assumption of the positive demand is 
2
1 2
8( ) ( )
24
m
B H B H
A c kq q
B
α
− −
− + + ∆
= =  
1 2
1
2B H B H
d d− −= = ∆ To verify the second order sufficient conditions for manufacturer 1, we need (i) 
2 1
2
1
0
M
B H
q
−∂ Π <
∂
, (ii) 
2 1
2
1
0
M
B H
d
−∂ Π <
∂
, and (iii) 
22 1 2 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
M M M
B H B H B H
q d q d
− − −    ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂Π>    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 Conditions (i) and 
(ii) are satisfy since 
2 1
2
1
2 0
M
B B
q
∂ Π
= − <
∂
and 
2 1
12
1
0
M
B H kq
d
−∂ Π = − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand. 
Condition (iii) is expressed as ( )
2
1 1
12 ( 2 )
2
Bkq k d > ∆ − 
 
. At 1 2B H
d −
∆
= , condition (iii) can be 
expressed as ( )12 0Bkq > , which holds since we assume the positive demand and , 0B k > . To 
verify the second order sufficient conditions for manufacturer 2, we need (i) 
2 2
2
2
0
M
B H
q
−∂ Π <
∂
, (ii) 
2 2
2
2
0
M
B H
d
−∂ Π <
∂
, and (iii) 
22 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
M M M
B H B H B H
q d q d
− − −    ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂Π>    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 Conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfy since 
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2 2
2
2
2 0
M
B H B
q
−∂ Π = − <
∂
and 
2 2
22
2
0
M
B H kq
d
−∂ Π = − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand. Condition (iii) is 
expressed as ( )
2
2 2
12 ( 2 )
2
Bkq k d > ∆ − 
 
. At 2 2H B
d −
∆
= , condition (iii) can be expressed as 
( )22 0Bkq > , which holds since we assume the positive demand and 2 2, 0kβ > . 
Hence, is 
2
1 2
8( ) ( )
24
m
B H B H
A c kq q
B
α
− −
− + + ∆
= = 1 2
1
2B H B H
d d− −= = ∆ are the unique optimal 
equilibrium solution. 
For Extended Model: 
For CGΠ  to be strictly concave in 1λ and we need (i) 
2
2
1
0
C
G
λ
∂ Π
<
∂
, (ii) 
2
2
2
0
C
G
λ
∂ Π
<
∂
, and (iii) det(H)>0, 
where H is the hessian matrix. Now, 
2
1 12
1
2 0
C
G k q
λ
∂ Π
= − <
∂
since 1 0k > and we asume positive 
demand. Likewise, 
2
2 22
2
2 0
C
G k q
λ
∂ Π
= − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand and 2 0k > . For 
condition (iii), we calculate the determinant of the Hessian matrix which results in 
( ) 1 2 1 24 0Det H k k q q= > from the previous assumptions.  
So the collector’s first order condition characterizes the unique best response,
1 2
1 2,2 2
α α
λ λ
∆ + ∆ +
= = . 
For the solution of the Cournot-game among manufacturers, we need to solve first order necessary 
conditions simultaneously for both manufacturers.  The only solution that satisfies the first order 
necessary conditions and does not violate our assumption of the positive demand is 
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
16 2 16 16 4 2 8 8 8 2
8( 4 )
m m
G
c k k k c k k kq β α β β γ β δ αβ β θ α θ γθ δ θ α θ θ
β β θ
− + − − ∆ − ∆ − + − + + ∆ + ∆
=
− +
 
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
16 2 16 16 4 2 8 8 8 2
32 8
m m
G
c k k k c k k kq β α β β γ β δ αβ β θ α θ γθ δ θ α θ θ
β β θ
− + − + + ∆ + ∆ + − + − − ∆ − ∆
=
−
1 1
1 ( )
2G
d α= ∆ − 2 2
1 ( )
2G
d α= ∆ −
 
To verify the second order sufficient conditions for manufacturer 1, we need (i) 
2 1
2
1
0
M
G
q
∂ Π
<
∂
, (ii) 
2 1
2
1
0
M
G
d
∂ Π
<
∂
, and (iii) 
22 1 2 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
M M M
G G G
q d q d
    ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂Π
>    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 Conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfy since 
2 1
12
1
2 0
M
G
q
β
∂ Π
= − <
∂
and 
2 1
1 12
1
0
M
G k q
d
∂ Π
= − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand. Condition (iii) is 
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expressed as ( )
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
12 ( 2 )
2
k q k dβ α > ∆ − − 
 
. At 1 1
1 ( )
2G
d α= ∆ − , condition (iii) can be 
expressed as ( )1 1 12 0k qβ > , which holds since we assume the positive demand and 1 1, 0kβ > . 
To verify the second order sufficient conditions for manufacturer 2, we need (i) 
2 2
2
2
0
M
G
q
∂ Π
<
∂
, (ii) 
2 2
2
2
0
M
G
d
∂ Π
<
∂
, and (iii) 
22 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
M M M
G G G
q d q d
    ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂Π
>    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 Conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfy since 
2 2
22
2
2 0
M
G
q
β
∂ Π
= − <
∂
and 
2 2
2 22
2
0
M
G k q
d
∂ Π
= − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand. Condition (iii) is 
expressed as ( )
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
12 ( 2 )
2
k q k dβ α > ∆ − − 
 
. At 2 2
1 ( )
2G
d α= ∆ − , condition (iii) can be 
expressed as ( )2 2 22 0k qβ > , which holds since we assume the positive demand and 2 2, 0kβ > . 
Hence, solution  
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
16 2 16 16 4 2 8 8 8 2
8( 4 )
m m
G
c k k k c k k kq β α β β γ β δ αβ β θ α θ γθ δ θ α θ θ
β β θ
− + − − ∆ − ∆ − + − + + ∆ + ∆
=
− +
 
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
16 2 16 16 4 2 8 8 8 2
32 8
m m
G
c k k k c k k kq β α β β γ β δ αβ β θ α θ γθ δ θ α θ θ
β β θ
− + − + + ∆ + ∆ + − + − − ∆ − ∆
=
−
 
1 1
1 ( )
2G
d α= ∆ − 2 2
1 ( )
2G
d α= ∆ − is the unique best response. 
For Extended Model: Homogeneous products.  
A similar analysis can be made with the simplifications of symmetric costs and unique selling price.  
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Appendix H.  Expression for *α  its Uniqueness and Bounds for Homogeneous Products 
For the extended model described in Section 4.3.1, with the help of Mathematica, we can solve :  
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )2 21 8 5 3 2 11 3 0288
G H
m
dTS k A c k
d B
α α α α
α
− = − ∆ − + + + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ =
 
As for the uniqueness of *α , we exploit the polynomial properties of the quartic objective 
function and the cubic equation for the first order necessary condition. That is, as 1) GTS is strictly 
concave between 0 and 3
5
∆
 and * 30
5
α
∆
< <  and 2) α is bounded from below as well as above, the 
optimal value of α must be unique and is equal to *α . 
 
Derivation of boundaries for *α : * 30
5
α
∆
< <  
From the optimal values of the decision variables with the revenue neutrality, we have 
(32( ) ( 7 )( ))(8( ) ( )( ))
576
m m
G H
A c k A c kTS
B
α α α α
−
− − − ∆ +∆ − − −∆ + ∆
=
 
The first order condition states that 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )2 21 8 5 3 2 11 3 0288
G H
m
dTS k A c k
d B
α α α α
α
− = − ∆ − + + + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ =  
By our definition, α is an incentive given to the collector/manufacturer. Hence, 0α ≥ (Also, if 
the optimal incentive α* is negative, we risk the collection rate (i.e. ( )
4
k α + ∆ ) to become negative). 
In addition, we observe that as α →∞ , the demand function will become negative. That is, α is 
bounded from below as well as above.  
We now analyze the first order condition at the minimum possible value of α*, which is 0. 
For 
 
α = 0 , ( )( )2
0
1 24 3
288
G H
m
dTS k A c k
d Bαα
−
=
= ∆ − + ∆ . From our assumption of the positive 
selling price and , , 0k B ∆ > , 
0
0G HdTS
d αα
−
=
> . We then analyze the first order condition at 3
5
α
∆
= , 
which shows 2 3
3
5
2
125
G HdTS k
d Bαα
−
∆
=
= − ∆ . Since , , 0k B ∆ > , 
3
5
0G HdTS
d αα
−
∆
=
< . Combining the 
results of the first order conditions at 30,
5
α
∆
= , we have * 30
5
α
∆
< <  if G HTS − is strictly concave. 
To prove the strict concavity, we can verify the second order condition for G HTS −  as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2
2 2
2
1 40 4 11 2 11 3
288
G H
m
d TS k A c k k
d B
α α α α
α
− = − − + − ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ + ∆ . For G HTS −  to be 
strictly concave, we need 
2
2 0
G Hd TS
dα
− < . From our assumptions, 0, 0
m
A cα ≥ − >  and 
 
k,∆ > 0 . It 
can be shown that the range of α that satisfies the conditions described above is
94 
 
( ) 280 4330
2 2 3
mc
k
δ β
α
−
+ ∆
∆
≤ < + . Since G HTS −  is strictly concave in the range 
 
α ∈ 0,∆  , we 
conclude that * 30
5
α
∆
< < .  
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Appendix I.  Relationships among the Total Surpluses as well as the Collection Rates of Basic 
Model, Extended Model, and Centrally Coordinated Model for the case of Homogeneous 
Products 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
(i) To prove  * *CC H G HTS TS− −> , we need to show that  
2 2(4 4 ) (32( ) ( 7 )( ))(8( ) ( )( ))
32 576
m m m
A c k A c k A c k
B B
α α α α− + ∆ − − − ∆ + ∆ − − −∆ + ∆
>  
 After simplification, this reduces to 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 44 3 2 2 3) 8 5 6 7 11 641 32( 6 8 6 0576 m mcm k A c AcA kB α α α α α α
 + + − − ∆ + ∆ + ∆ −
 
+ − + ∆ + ∆ − ∆ >
 It can be verified that the three terms inside the bracket are positive since * 30,
5
α   
 
∆
∈ . Hence, 
* *
CC H G HTS TS− −> .  
(ii) To prove * *G H B HTS TS− −>  we need to show that  
( )( ) ( )( )2 28 32 7(32( ) ( 7 )( ))(8( ) ( )( ))
576 576
m mm m
A c k A c kA c k A c k
B B
α α α α − + ∆ − + ∆− − − ∆ +∆ − − −∆ +∆
>  
From Appendix H, we know that G HTS − is strictly concave in the range of α of our interest. We take 
a value for α in the range of solution (i.e. 0,3∆/5) We have 
( ) ( )2 23 398 32
4 4
2 576
m m
G H
A c k A c k
TS
B
α−
  − + ∆ − + ∆  ∆    = = 
 
 and 
( )( )2 2
*
224 5
0
2 9216
m
G M B H
k A c k
TS TS
B
α− −
∆ − + ∆∆ = − = > 
 
. Therefore, * *EM BTS TS> . 
(i) To prove that * *G H B Hϕ ϕ− −> , we need
*
4 4
k kα ∆ + ∆ >   
  
. From Appendix H, * 0α > . Hence, 
* *
G H B Hϕ ϕ− −> . 
(ii) To prove that * *CC H G Hϕ ϕ− −> , we need
*
2 4
k k α ∆ ∆ +  >   
   
. From Appendix H, * 3
5
α
∆
< . 
Hence, *
2
5G H
kϕ −
∆
< , and * *CC H G Hϕ ϕ− −> . 
Relationships between the collector profits, manufacturers profits, and consumer surpluses for Basic 
Model and Extended Model with homogeneous products 
(i) * *C CG H B H− −Π > Π :  
It can be verified that 
( ) ( ) ( )( )2* 2* * 28
192
mC
G H
k A c k
B
α α
−
+∆ − − −∆
Π =
 is convex in the range of 
30,
5
α
∆ ∈ 
 
, which implies that CG H−Π is an increasing function of α . Hence,
* *C C
G H B−Π >Π .  
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(ii) * *M MG H B H− −Π < Π : 
For the manufacturers profits, it is easy to see that 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2* *
2
22 * 28 8
576 576
m mM M
G H B H
A c k A c k
B B
α
− −
− + ∆ − − + ∆
Π = < Π = since * 0α > . 
(iii) * *EM BCS CS<  : 
For the consumer surplus, it is easy to see that  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2
2
22 * 2
* *
8 8
288 288
m m
G H B H
A c k A c k
CS CS
B B
α
− −
− + ∆ − − + ∆
= < =  since * 0α > . 
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Appendix J. Derivation of Boundaries for *Mα  
Proof of Proposition 5. 
For the case of multiple manufacturers, we have 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
2 2
2
8 8 2 2 3
128 1
m m
M
A c k n n A c k n
TS
B n
α α α− + ∆ − + − − + ∆ − ∆ − ∆
=
+
  
We now analyze the first order condition at the minimum possible value of α*, which is 0. 
For 
 
α = 0 , ( )( )2
0
1 8 0
64 (1 )
M
m
dTS k n A c k
d B nαα =
= ∆ − + ∆ >
+
We then analyze the first order 
condition at ( 1)( 3)
n
n
α
+ ∆
=
+
, which shows Combining the results of the first order conditions at 
( 1)0, ( 3)
n
n
α
+ ∆
=
+
, we have * ( 1)0 ( 3)
n
n
α
+ ∆
< <
+
 since MTS is strictly concave in the range of interest. 
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Appendix K. Optimality of Total Surplus in Centrally Coordinated Model with Competition 
and Derivation of Instruments 
 
For CCTS , the only solution that satisfies the first order necessary conditions, and does not violate our 
assumption of the positive demand is 
2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
4 4 4 4
4( )
m m
CC
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− − ∆ − + + ∆
=
− +
 
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
4 4 4 4
4( )
m m
CC
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− + + ∆ + − − ∆
=
−
1
1 2
e
∆
= 22 2
e
∆
=
 
To verify the second order sufficient conditions, we need (i) 
2
2 0
CC
i
TS
q
∂
<
∂
, (ii) 
2
2 0
CC
i
TS
e
∂
<
∂
, and (iii) 
22 2
2 2
CC CC CC
i i i i
TS TS TS
q e q e
    ∂ ∂ ∂
>    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂    
 Conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfy since 
2
2 0
CC
i
i
TS
q
β
∂
= − <
∂
and 
2
2 2 0
CC
i i
i
TS k q
e
∂
= − <
∂
 since we assume positive demand. Condition (iii) is expressed as 
( ) ( )22 ( 2 )i i i i i ik q k eβ > ∆ − . At 2
i
ie
∆
= , condition (iii) can be expressed as ( )2 0i i ik qβ > , which 
holds since we assume the positive demand and , 0i ikβ > . Hence, 
2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
1 2
1 2
4 4 4 4
4( )
m m
CC
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− − ∆ − + + ∆
=
− +
 
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2
1 2
4 4 4 4
4( )
m m
CC
c k c kq β β δ β θ δ θ θ
β β θ
− + + ∆ + − − ∆
=
−
1
1 2
e
∆
= 22 2
e
∆
= is the unique optimal
 
solution. 
A similar approach can be made for the homogeneous case to see that 1 2 2CC H CC H
e e− −
∆
= =
2
1 2
4 4
4
m
A c kq q
B
− + ∆
+ = is the unique optimal solution. 
Derivation of the incentives and fees for homogeneous product model 
 
Proof of Proposition 6.  
Under the proposed mechanism, the collector’s profit function is expressed as                                             
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( )( ) ( )( )C q k d q k dλ λ α λ λ αΠ = − + + − + . Because the objective function is strictly 
concave in 1λ and 2λ  , from the first order conditions, the unique best response is 2
i
i
d α
λ
−
= . The 
manufacturers’ profit maximizing problem is formulated as 
1
1 2 1 1 1 1( ( ) ( ))MG H mA Bq Bq c d k d q Fε λ−Π = − − − − + ∆ − − −  
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2
2 1 2 2 2 2( ( ) ( ))MG H mA Bq Bq c d k d q Fε λ−Π = − − − − + ∆ − − −  
Given iλ , we have 2i
d α∆ −= . Hence, 
4i
e
α + ∆
= . To satisfy the first requirement ( *
2CC
e
∆
= ), 
we set α = ∆ . For the second requirement, we need 
2
1 2
4 4
4
m
A c kq q
B
− + ∆
+ =  . Hence, the second 
requirement is: 
2 24 4 4 2 4 4
6 4
m mA c k A c k
B B
ε
=
− − + ∆ − + ∆
. The last requirement of the revenue 
neutrality implies that ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2q k d q k d q q Fα λ α λ ε− + − = + + . By simultaneous solution 
of the last two expressions with respect to F and ε , we have:                                         
( )( )21 48 mA c kε = − − + ∆  and 
( )( ) ( )( )2 24 4 3
64
m mA c k A c kF
B
− + ∆ − + ∆
= Hence, with the values 
of α , F , and ε specified as above, the pricing of the incentives and fees is complete. 
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